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 1 
Abstract 
 
This study seeks to explore whether Africa’s strategic partnership with industrial 
countries in the areas of trade and investment, as envisaged by the New Partnership 
for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), promotes economic development in Africa. 
This question is triggered by the fact that NEPAD has received mixed attention 
from the African and the international community. The programme is promoted by 
the liberal scholars while in the meantime criticized by those belonging to the 
dependency school of thoughts. NEPAD stems from liberal ideas that trade is a 
positive sum-game, but its reliance on foreign investment could also create a 
dependency dilemma for Africa. Nonetheless, the study hypothesizes that the 
NEPAD strategic trade and investment partnership seems to be a realistic and 
beneficial project for the development of Africa. In the light of the above, the 
research seeks to measure trade and investment flows between Africa and the 
developed world since the inception of NEPAD.    
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Chapter 1: Introduction, motivation and purpose 
  
1. Hypothesis 
 
The NEPAD strategic trade and investment partnership is a realistic and beneficial 
project for the development of Africa.  
 
2. Introduction 
 
Over the last two decades, Africa has not been successful in getting a fair share of global 
trade and foreign direct investment (FDI). For example, Africa‟s share of world FDI 
declined from 2.2 % in 1992 to 0.8% in 2000. Its share value of world merchandize 
export also decreased from 6.3 % in 1980 to 2.5 % in 2000.
1
 This poor record is due to 
weak supply capacity such as competition and market access despite substantial rise in 
export revenues in recent years.
2
 Also, political and macroeconomic instability, low 
growth and weak infrastructure, poor governance, and ineffective marketing strategies are 
amongst other issues to blame for lower FDI inflows into Africa.
3
  
 
Post 2000, Africa started to witness some improvements with world trade and 
investments averaging 3% in 2007.
4
 Although it is not clear whether such improvements 
can be attributed to continental initiatives such as The New Partnership for Africa‟s 
Development (NEPAD) it is difficult to ignore the impact of rhetoric such as good 
governance, encouragement of intra-regional trade and developmental partnership.  
 
                                                 
1
 Dupasquier, C. and Osakwe, P.N.: “Foreign Direct Investment in Africa: Performance, Challenges and 
Responsibilities” in African Trade Policy Centre (ATPC), No. 21, Economic Commission for Africa, 2005.                            
http://www.uneca.org/ATPC/Work%20in%20progress/21.pdf 
2
 UNCTAD: Economic Development in Africa: Export Performance Following Trade Liberalization: Some 
Patterns and Policy Perspectives, United Nations, New York and Geneva, 2008, p. 1.                                 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/aldcafrica2008_en.pdf 
3
 Dupasquier, C. and Osakwe, P.N Op. Cit. 22 
4
 UNCTAD Op. Cit. 1 See also UNCTAD:  World Investment Report: Transnational Corporations and the 
Infrastructure Challenge, United Nations, New York and Geneva, 2008, p. 18. 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2008_en.pdf 
 3 
In this context, it seems like Africa could recover its market share if the NEPAD plan is 
taken seriously and implemented by African leaders. Indeed, African countries are 
encouraged by its development partners to implement regional trade protocols in line 
with the NEPAD priorities in order to promote intra-African trade and economic 
integration in Africa.
5
 In other words, regional economic integration and cooperation 
seems to be the way forward in rectifying global trade imbalance in Africa. According to 
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), given the strong 
political support for NEPAD in the international community, it is expected that these 
efforts will be complemented by their development partners.
6
 
 
The NEPAD programme is aimed at shaping African integration into the dominant global 
forces and hence a higher degree of participation in international political and economic 
affairs.
7
 In essence, NEPAD‟s main vision is to create the conditions and the environment 
conducive to trade and long-term investment for Africa. Hence, the programme 
encourages issues such as “the liberalization of trade, the reform of financial and 
commodity and other markets, the functioning of multilateral institutions, development 
assistance and resources transfers from the developed to the developing world.”8 
Arguably, it seems if one goes along these lines, NEPAD will allow Africa to play an 
effective part in the global economic map and body politics.  
 
However, because of its neo-liberal policies, and its emphasis on partnership rather than 
self-reliance, there are fears that NEPAD could be an over-ambitious project. Critics 
argue that, NEPAD has been “the brainchild of western creditors, thus enjoying more 
legitimacy abroad and little credibility at home.”9 Nonetheless, it becomes difficult to 
conceptualise “self-reliance” in a globalized and interdependent world. Yet considering 
                                                 
5
 Ibid. 83 
6
 UNCTAD Op. Cit. 54 
7
 Melber, H.: “South Africa and NEPAD-quo vadis?” in Policy Review Brief, No. 31, Centre for Policy 
Study, Johannesburg, 2004, p. 2. 
8
 Landsberg, C. “The Birth and Evolution of NEPAD” in Akokpari, J. Ndinga-Muvumba, A. and T. Murithi 
(eds): the African Union and its Institutions, Fanele, Cape Town, 2008.p, 214.  
9
 Hills, M.: The AU/NEPAD and Africa‟s Evolving Governance and Security Architecture: A Policy 
Advisory Group Meeting, the Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, and the Centre for Policy 
Studies, Johannesburg, South Africa, 2004, p. 13. Citing, Cheik Tidiane Gadio 
 4 
the un-competitiveness of the African economies, it seems the project‟s critics have a 
case, nevertheless, taking into account the dominance of liberalism in international 
political economy, there is a merit in the argument of the project‟s proponents that 
NEPAD is a beneficial project for Africa.  
 
In light of these different interpretations of the programme, the study seeks to explore 
whether Africa‟s strategic partnership with industrial countries in the areas of trade and 
investment, as envisaged by the NEPAD, promotes economic development in Africa. 
This question is triggered by the fact that NEPAD has received mixed attention from both 
the African and the international community. While largely informed by the liberal 
paradigm which views trade relationship as a positive sum-game, NEPAD‟s reliance on 
foreign investment could also create a dependency dilemma for Africa.  
 
3. Statement of the Problem 
 
There are contending views on the NEPAD‟s strategic trade and investment approach on 
economic development in Africa. Critics of this programme largely informed by 
dependency thinking, postulate that, since Africa is uncompetitive in the global market, 
trade and investment partnership with the industrialized countries as envisaged by the 
NEPAD could further marginalize the continent‟s economies in the global market.  
 
On the other hand, the proponents of NEPAD - influenced by the liberal paradigm - posit 
that the programme is a viable tool to promote economic development in Africa by way 
of facilitating the continent‟s trade with the outside world which could in turn attract 
foreign investment into the region. Clearly, NEPAD‟s vision of constructing a „strategic 
trade and investment partnership‟ between Africa and the industrialized world remains 
under scrutiny. This research seeks to explore the successes and limitations of NEPAD‟s 
strategic trade and investment approach since the establishment of the programme in 
2001.  
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4. Aim and Objective 
 
There has been a significant literature on NEPAD but there has not been a conclusive 
study on the nature of this programme. Particularly, not enough has been said about the 
nature of the relationship between NEPAD and its external partners in trade and 
investment matters. Furthermore, NEPAD is often judged and assessed in terms of its 
ideological landscape. Indeed, the assessment of NEPAD should be based on efficiency 
or its capacity to deliver trade and investment for instance.  
 
Therefore, the purpose of this study is to analyse the extent to which strategic partnership 
with industrialized countries in terms of trade and investment as sketched out by the 
NEPAD plan could affect the economic growth and development of Africa. In that light, 
the study could contribute in defining and explaining the nature of the NEPAD strategy. 
This research, therefore, will be guided by the following questions:  
 
 What kind of incentives does NEPAD create to attract trade and investment flow 
into Africa?  
 Has NEPAD brought about trade and investment to the African continent since its 
inception? In other words, what are the losses and benefits so far in relation to 
Africa‟s development since the establishment of NEPAD and what conditions 
have led to those results? 
 Using Ghana as a case study, does commitment to good governance through peer 
review lead to greater resources flow for development as envisaged by NEPAD? 
 
Therefore, to assess the contribution of NEPAD to Africa, one should first begin by 
debating this project, its principle actors, as well as the principles and conditions 
governing its engagement with the external world. This study aims to understand the 
meaning and implications of concepts such as „strategic partnerships‟, which under 
NEPAD‟s framework implies „mutual accountability and mutual responsibility.‟  
 
 6 
To measure “mutual partnership” in terms of trade and investment between NEPAD and 
its developed partners, the study will mainly analyse NEPAD‟s strategy to mobilize 
resources from the developed world to Africa which includes two initiatives: capital flow 
and market access. The study analyzes trends in agriculture, Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) and FDI flows into Africa after the adoption of NEPAD‟s good 
governance agenda. The study also focuses on commitment by African countries to the 
African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), taking Ghana as a case study, and its effect on 
ODA provision, to assess whether “mutual responsibility” and “mutual accountability” 
has been achieved between Africa and its development partners. In so doing, the study 
analyzes whether trade and investment conditions have improved in Africa after the 
adoption of NEPAD.  
 
5. Literature Review 
 
NEPAD itself means different things to different people. On the one hand, its architects 
and foremost advocates define it as a project to integrate African economies into the 
global market so as to promote economic growth and development in the region ( 
Landsberg; Ilorah; Chibundu; Adededji; and Onimode et al
10
 …etc.) Venter and Neuland 
support the above and argue that given the fact that Africa is an indispensable resource 
base, sustainable economic growth and development will depend on a global partnership 
like the NEPAD project which focuses on the supply and demand of goods and services, 
healthy environment, cross-border migration, a global financial system that ameliorates 
                                                 
10
 Landsberg, C Op. Cit; Ilorah, R.: “Trade, aid and National Development in Africa” in Development 
Southern Africa, Vol. 25, No.1, 2008; Chibundu, M.O. “NEPAD and the Rebirth of Development Theory 
and Praxis” in Levitt, J.E (eds): Africa: Mapping New Boundaries in International Law, Hart Publishing, 
Oxford, 2008; Adedeji, A.“NEPAD‟s African Peer Review Mechanism: Progress and Prospects” in 
Akopar, J. Ndinga-Muvumba, A. and T. Murithi (eds): the African Union and its Institutions, Fanele, Cape 
Town, 2008; and Onimode et al, B.: African Development and Governance Strategies in the 21
st
 Century, 
Zed Books, London, 2004. 
 
 
 
 7 
socio-economic conditions and a global governance that recognizes partnerships among 
all people.
11
  
 
On the other hand, critics argue that the project is largely written in the language of neo-
liberal free market fundamentalisms which often retards the economic take off of Africa,  
which could further marginalize the continent in the global market (Bond; Taylor; 
Chabal
12
...etc). Akokpari points out that NEPAD favours a market approach to 
development “which in practice may prove detrimental to development.”13 NEPAD‟s 
opponents further argue that countries including the more advanced ones are quick to 
sign commitments but are reluctant to indicate when and how to realize them. Edozie 
clearly states that NEPAD has the rhetoric for development but lacks a clear defined 
strategy of how to approach its initiatives.
14
 As the Senegalese Foreign Minister, Cheik 
Tidiane Gadio points out “the time for rhetoric is over and concrete implementation of 
projects needs to begin so that the people can benefit.”15 But, as pointed out earlier, 
NEPAD‟s major criticisms come from its over-reliance on partnership as opposed to self-
reliance.  
 
Therefore, the study makes an intellectual contribution to the current literature on the 
North-South debate. The North refers to the advanced and industrialized countries 
primarily situated in the northern hemisphere while the South refers to the developing 
nations primarily situated in the Southern hemisphere. More important, the study 
contributes to the understanding of the relationship between Africa and the developed 
world on matters related to trade and investment. 
                                                 
11
 Venter, D. and Neuland, E.: Regional Integration: Economic Partnership Agreements for Eastern and 
Southern Africa, Institute for Business Innovation, Johannesburg, 2007, p. 228-22. 
12
 Bond, P. and Zapiro, C.: Talk left and Walk Right: South Africa‟s Frustrated Global Reforms, University 
of KwaZulu-Natal Press, Pietermaritzburg, 2004; Taylor, I.: NEPAD: toward Africa‟s Development or 
another False Start? Lynne Rienner Publisher, London, 2005; and Chabal, P.: “The Quest for good 
government and development in Africa: is NEPAD the answer?” in International Affairs, Vol.78, No. 3, 
2002.  
13
 Akokpari, J. “Dilemmas of Regional Integration and Development in Africa” in Akokpari, J. Ndinga-
Muvumba, A. and T. Murithi (eds): the African Union and its Institutions, Fanele, Cape Town, 2008, p. 90. 
14
 Edozie, R. K.: “Promoting African Owned and Operated‟ Development: A Reflection on the New 
Partnership for African Development (NEPAD)” in African and Asian Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2004, p. 160. 
15
 Murithi, T.: The African Union, Peace-building and Development, Ashgate, London, 2005, p. 144. 
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6. Methodology 
 
This study provides a review of literature from the area of International Relations (IR). 
The study is qualitative but relies on quantitative information such as economic figures, 
tables, graphs and statistical data. From the available quantitative information, a 
qualitative analysis of trade and investment fluctuations in Africa since 2001 to date is 
provided. Trade and investment statistics are readily available at the NEPAD 
headquarters, and the South African Institute of International Relations (SAIIA). In 
addition, the African Development Bank, the United Nations Development Report, the 
UNCTAD are also consulted. Furthermore, the study presents a deductive logic of 
reasoning which starts from the general and ends with the specific. 
 
Primary sources in this study include official policy documents, reports and treaties from 
NEPAD, the African Union (AU), the G-8, the United Nations (UN), the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (WTO)…etc. 
Secondary sources consist of existing literature on the subject of NEPAD. This includes 
books, book chapters, published articles, newspapers and news magazines. Much of the 
research will be conducted in the library of the Witwatersrand University, the University 
of Johannesburg and the SAIIA library. In addition to this, inter-library loans facilities 
and Internet sources will also be relied upon.  
 
This paper will further use case studies method to make a contribution to the central 
research problem. George and Bennett define a case as “an instance of a class of 
events.”16 The term class of events means a phenomenon of scientific interest, such as 
revolutions, type of governmental regimes, kinds of economic systems, or personality 
types that one can use to develop a theory (or “generic knowledge”) regarding the causes 
of similarities or differences among instances (cases) of that class of event.
17
  
 
                                                 
16
 George, A. L. and Bennett, A.: Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences MIT Press 
Cambridge, Massachusetts London, 2005, p. 17-18. 
17
 Loc cit 
 9 
The merit of employing a case study in the IR discourse is profound. Case studies method 
is applicable to the IR sub-field of International Political Economy. Given the growing 
importance of economic interactions among countries and the increasing role of global 
economy since World War II, many studies in this field focus on issues related to the 
politics of international trade, foreign economic policy-making, international institutions 
and cooperation.
18
  
 
Qualitative case studies method offers appealing advantages relative to other alternative 
methods such as statistical. “More comprehensive and more detailed contact with 
concrete instances of the events and behaviour about which we wish to generalize helps 
sharpen distinctions. It stimulates fresh concepts, typologies, and hypotheses.”19 In this 
study, case studies method is important for three reasons: to measure key concepts, to 
help develop and build the theoretical framework of the study, and to test the hypothesis 
of the study.   
 
First, case studies method allows for contextualized comparison between concepts that 
are difficult to measure. It helps achieving a “high level of conceptual validity, or to 
identify and measure the indicators that best represent the theoretical concepts” that this 
study intends to measure.
20
 These include the “concepts of mutual accountability” and 
“mutual responsibility.”  
 
Second, case studies can be used to test a theory. According to George and Bennett, “the 
goal here is rarely to refute a theory decisively but, rather to identify whether and how the 
scope conditions of competing theories should be expanded or narrowed.”21 The goal is 
also to critique or contribute to theory-building.
22
 In this study, the use of case studies 
method will mainly help to test the theory of liberalism against the dependency theory. 
This will contribute to the understanding of state behaviour in the international system. It 
                                                 
18
 Sprinz, D.F and Wolinsky-Nahmias, Y.: Models, Number, and Cases: Method for Studying International 
Relations, University of Michigan, U.S.A, 2004, p. 3. 
19
 Odell, J.S.: “Case Study Methods in International Political Economy” in International Studies 
Perspectives, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2001, p. 161. 
20
 George, A. L. and Bennett Op. Cit. 19 
21
 Lo cit. 115 
22
 Odell, J.S Op. Cit. 161 
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will also help to understand the subject of interdependence between developed and 
developing countries in the international system. This study is going to test the theory of 
liberalism in three case studies: Ghana, Rwanda and Zimbabwe.  
 
Third, one appealing advantage of case studies methods is the ability to generate 
hypothesis. Case studies allow “stronger empirical grounding for a hypothesis for the 
cases studied. They allow greater confidence in the validity of the hypothesis, for the 
cases studied, than statistical methods can provide for the same case naturally.”23   
 
There exist different types of case studies methods in the social science discipline ranging 
from explanatory to exploratory to descriptive to multiple-case studies and so forth. This 
report offers an instrumental type of case study. The purpose is “to accomplish something 
other than understanding a particular situation. It provides insight into an issue or help to 
refine a theory. The case of a secondary interest; it plays a supportive role, facilitating our 
understating of something else.”24 Other types of case studies methods could not be used 
because they would not suit the method‟s objective which is to develop and test concepts, 
theory and hypothesis. This work is an instrumental case study because it assesses 
whether NEPAD as a liberal project is successful or not. In addition to theory-building, it 
generates the hypothesis it presents and refines key concepts such as “mutual 
accountability” and “mutual responsibility.” 
 
7. Chapters Outline 
 
In addition to the Introductory Chapter, this study will consist of four chapters, which are 
ranged as follow: 
 
Chapter 2: Theoretical and conceptual framework 
 
                                                 
23
 Loc cit.170 Odell 
24
 Baxter, P. and Jack, S.: “Qualitative Case Study Methodology: Study Design and Implementation for 
Novice Researchers” in The Qualitative Report, Vol.13, No. 4, 2008, p. 549. 
 11 
This chapter will elaborate the relevance of the theory of liberalism in addressing the 
central research question of the study and how it is suited to prove its hypothesis. The 
chapter will also define key concepts of the study such as “mutual partnership”, “mutual 
accountability” and “mutual responsibility” and how these concepts feature in the theory 
of liberalism.  
 
Chapter 3: Assessment of the concept of “mutual partnership”: a reflection of NEPAD‟s 
resource mobilization strategy.  
 
This chapter will assess the achievement and failure made by NEPAD as a partnership 
project in terms of trade and investment through the examination of economic data on 
ODA and FDI. 
 
Chapter 4: Assessment of the concepts of “mutual accountability” and “mutual 
responsibility”: a case study on Ghana. 
 
This chapter will provide a case study on Ghana to investigate whether the country‟s 
commitment to good governance through peer review has led the industrialized world to 
transfer resources for development into the country as envisaged by NEPAD. 
 
Chapter 5: Conclusion and recommendations 
 
This chapter will summarize the main points of the study, the findings and 
recommendations.                                                                                                                               
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Chapter 2: Theoretical and conceptual framework 
 
1. Introduction 
 
New trade and investment relationships between developed and developing nations 
restructure today‟s economic development policies. This has been pioneered with the 
emergence of the NEPAD programme that envisages building a strategic trade and 
investment partnerships between Africa and its development partners based on „mutual 
accountability‟ and „mutual responsibility‟. This dynamism is promoted through adopting 
liberal notions of free market, free trade and, economic cooperation and interdependence.  
 
The main purpose of this chapter is to explain how the theory of liberalism helps in 
answering the central research question and assessing the accuracy of the hypothesis. The 
chapter argues that such liberal assumptions embedded in the NEPAD programme such 
as that economic cooperation and interdependence brings about development, are best 
seen through NEPAD‟s efforts to establish “mutual partnership”, “mutual accountability” 
and mutual “responsibility”. “Partnership conveys the existence of a relationship stronger 
than cooperation, but weaker than a compact. It suggests joint effort and joint 
responsibility – the concept of interdependence.”25 The chapter also aims to highlight the 
type of incentives created by NEPAD to attract foreign trade and investment into Africa. 
These include the promotion of peace and security and the strengthening of democratic 
good governance in Africa through peer review mechanism.  
 
Initially, NEPAD was mandated to focus on three priority areas namely preconditions for 
sustainable development (political, economic and corporate governance); sectoral 
priorities such as agriculture and market access, human resource development, 
infrastructure, and environment and resource mobilization.
26
 The programme is further 
expected to achieve high rate of growth, high employment, alleviating poverty and 
inequality, diversifying production structures, improving international competitiveness, 
                                                 
25
 Diescho, J.: Understanding the NEPAD, Namibia Institute for Democracy in cooperation with the 
Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Windhoek, 2002, p. 19.  
26
 AU: The High Level Panel: Audit of the African Union, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 2007, p. 140. 
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and enhancing exports and co-operations.
27
 This piece of work focuses mainly on the 
resource mobilization sectors of NEPAD, which include capital flows and market access. 
To achieve these objectives, NEPAD promotes liberal ideas of good governance through 
Peer Review Mechanisms, strengthens democracy, peace and security in the African 
region, and builds partnerships with the industrial countries while strengthening regional 
economic integration and reforms in economic policy in Africa. 
 
The chapter is divided into three sections. Section one will detail the theory of liberalism. 
Section two will define key concepts such as „partnerships‟, „mutual accountability‟ and 
„mutual responsibility‟ and their link with liberalism. These concepts are important in this 
study for two compelling reasons: (1) partnership itself goes hand in hand with the notion 
of economic cooperation and interdependence articulated in the liberal framework and (2) 
“mutual accountability‟ and “mutual responsibility” reinforce that partnership. 
Partnership is also an incentive to bring trade and investment opportunities into Africa. 
The other key incentives created by NEPAD that are going to be  highlighted in this 
chapter are the promotion of democracy, peace and security, and the strengthening of 
good governance agenda through peer review.  
 
2. The theory of liberalism  
 
Liberalism focuses on the behaviour of individuals, firms and states in the global 
economy. It views individuals as the main unit of analysis assuming that they have 
complete information to make rational decisions at the lowest possible level. It advocates 
the free interplay of the market and rejects political interference in the market economy. 
According to this theory, “if individuals are left freely to engage in production, exchange 
and consumption all will benefit and that the insertion of state control distorts benefits 
and ads cost to participants in the market.”28 Put another way, once the state stays away 
from the market, the benefit of trade will automatically trickle down throughout society.
29
 
                                                 
27
 Loc cit 
28
 O‟Brien, R. and Williams, M.: Global Political Economy: Evolution and dynamics, Palgrave Macmillan, 
2007, p. 18-19. 
29
 Ibid. 20 
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Therefore, the protection of individual consumers and producers from unfriendly 
government policies becomes a major concern for liberal thinkers. Thus, by opening up 
the market economy and by liberating international trade, liberalism assumes that people 
will be able to increase their choices and widen their economic decisions. 
 
Liberalism promotes free trade and sees it as a positive sum-game. Free trade simply 
means the flow of capital into and out of countries without difficulty and the removal of 
barriers to all forms of economic activities.
30
 According to Gilpin, liberalism is “a 
doctrine and a set of principles for organizing and managing a market economy in order 
to achieve maximum efficiency, economic growth, individual welfare free market and 
individual equality and liberty.”31 Noshab also states that, “an efficient and flourishing 
economy is proportional to the enhanced role of market forces and economy opened to 
free trade and competition.”32  
 
Liberalism also views trade as an “engine” of economic growth. It is built on the 
assumption that economic prosperity can be borne out of the interaction of different 
individuals pursuing their own self-interests.
33
 This requires a free movement of goods 
and services, and an increasing transfer of knowledge and technology across borders.
34
 
On that note, liberal thinkers such as Adam Smith and David Ricardo have developed a 
theory of comparative advantage, which exemplifies that thinking. Accordingly, “even in 
a situation where one country enjoys superiority in the production of all goods and 
services over a second country, trade between the two will benefit both countries.”35 
 
Furthermore, liberalism promotes democracy and links it with trade. It claims that 
democracies do not fight democracies. Indeed, democracies, “share an interest in creating 
economic, political, and security conditions in which peace, prosperity and democracy 
                                                 
30
 Ibid. 18 
31
 Gilpin, R.: The Political Economy of International Relations, Princeton, New Jersey, 1987, p. 14. 
32
 Noshab, F.: “Globalization, WTO and Pakistan” in the Muslim World, Vol. 96, No. 2, 2006, p. 342. 
33
 Gilpin, R Op. Cit. 14 
34
 Loc cit 
35
 O‟Brien, R. and William, M Op. Cit. 20 Citing Adam Smith 
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can strive.”36 As Reuveny and Maxwell put forward, trade and peace are mutually 
supportive goals thus, “trade causes peace because conflict leads to a loss in trade 
gains.”37 
 
More importantly, liberalism promotes economic cooperation and interdependence. For 
instance, the theory encourages countries to deal with the international economy in as 
much as the same way they manage their own domestic ones.
38
 It views the international 
system as one of interdependence as opposed to anarchy. In this view “states and peoples 
can cooperate for mutual benefit…rather than zero-sum game where one‟s gains are the 
other‟s losses, liberals see a positive sum game where the pie grows bigger and everyone 
gains.”39 Quoted in Mingst, Emmanuel Kant, a liberal philosopher, argues that, 
“international anarchy can be overcome through some kind of collective action - a 
federation of states in which sovereignties would be left intact.”40 These liberal principles 
are also promoted by the NEPAD programme.  
 
The NEPAD is a liberal project, which adopts ideas of free trade and economic 
interdependence. The programme is in line with neo-liberal policies driven by 
multilateral institutions such as the IMF/World Bank. According to the theory of neo-
liberalism, “in the new international economic system all countries are „dependent‟ to 
some extent on each other and to the extent that „dependency‟ becomes translated into 
„interdependency.‟ ”41 Hence, NEPAD reaffirms that “African governments will assure 
the continued participation in the web of conditionality-driven multilateral programmes 
sponsored by international financial institutions and developed country governments, 
                                                 
36
 Lebovic, J.H.: “Uniting for Peace? Democracies and United Nations Peace Operations after the Cold 
War” in The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 48, No. 6, December 2004, p. 912.  
37
 Rauveny, R. and Maxwell, J.: “Free Trade and Arms Races” in The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 
42, No.6, 1998, p. 775. 
38
 Frieden, J. A. and D. A. Lake. “International Politics and International Economics” in Goddard, C. R, 
Cronin, P. and K. C. Dash (eds): International Political Economy: State market relations in a changing 
global order (2
nd
 edition). Palgrave, MacMillan, 2003, p. 28. 
39
 Gilpin, R.: Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Political Order, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 2001, p. 18. 
40
 Mingst, K.A.: Essential of International Relations (4
th
 Edition), W.W. North & Company, New York, 
2008, p. 60. Citing Kant 
41
Hills, J.: “Dependency Theory and Its Relevance Today: International Institutions in Telecommunications 
and Structural Power” in Review of International Studies, Vol. 20, No. 2, April 1994, p. 172. 
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thereby lending their imprimatur of respectability and legitimacy to these programmes.”42 
As Walt points out, international institutions like the IMF “could help overcome selfish 
state behavior mainly by encouraging states to forgo immediate gains for the greater 
benefits of enduring cooperation.”43  
 
Moreover, in its search for a “strategic partnership” between African nations and their 
development partners, NEPAD contributes to the liberal view of international 
cooperation and interdependence. NEPAD promotes enhanced cooperation between 
Africa and its development partners in its struggle for domestic welfare provision and 
economic growth and development in Africa.
44
 It reaffirms that economic growth and 
development cannot be left in the hands of African leaders alone. Instead, such an 
ambitious initiative requires active involvement of other international actors also known 
as development partners. As a partial fulfilment of this objective, NEPAD speaks of a 
“strategic partnership” between Africa and the industrialized powers, which focuses on 
the idea of „mutual „accountability‟, and „mutual responsibility.‟  
 
Given the central research question of the study, it is of crucial importance to assess 
whether NEPAD has been successful in achieving its goals of attracting trade and 
investment flows into Africa to affect economic growth and development. To determine 
this, the study will assess key aspects of NEPAD‟s agenda such as “mutual partnership”, 
“mutual accountability‟ and “mutual responsibility” all as indicators of development. 
These indicators could best be explained by the theory of liberalism as it envisages 
positive gains and economic prosperity within the context of a globalized free market 
system through outward looking policies in trade and investment, greater engagement 
with the global economy, and more importantly economic cooperation and 
interdependence.  
 
                                                 
42
 Chibundu, M.O Op. Cit. 284. 
43
 Walt, S.M.: “International Relations: one World, Many Theories” in Foreign Policy, No.110, Special 
Edition: Frontiers of Knowledge, 1998, p. 32. 
44
 de Waal, A.: “What's New in the 'New Partnership for Africa's Development'?” in International Affairs 
Vol. 78, No. 3, July 2002, p. 466. 
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Realist ideology would not serve the purpose of the study because it overemphasizes the 
role of the state in world politics and does not take into account the role of other actors 
such as international institutions and regional mechanisms like NEPAD. The theory 
considers the international system to be anarchical in nature about power, and considers 
the pursuit of national interests to take precedence.
45
 It perceives international economic 
cooperation as a zero-sum game, that is, “the gain of one party necessitates a loss for 
another party.”46 Realism therefore does not pay attention to the idea of partnership or 
cooperation for international development. This undermines moral responsibilities such 
as the promotion of economic development and the fight against poverty in developing 
regions including Africa. Clearly, liberalism is relevant in this study because it 
strengthens the importance of international cooperation, and NEPAD‟s search for a 
strategic partnership between Africa and its development partners is no exception.  
 
Constructivism could possibly add values to the central research question. Constructivism 
is a movement in IR that examines the manner in which changes in ideas embedded at the 
international and domestic level helps shape the direction of state‟s interests.47 It is 
mainly concerned with the sources of change in foreign policy, which obviously include 
social attributes such as ideas and interests. According to Walt, constructivism “is best 
suited to the analysis of how identities and interests can change over time, thereby 
producing far - reaching but unexpected shifts in international affairs.”48 Thus, the unique 
contribution constructivism could perhaps make to the research question would be to 
explain how factors such as ideas, interests and norms could alter NEPAD‟s engagement 
with its external partners or vice versa.  
 
However, constructivism is not sufficient to address the central research question because 
it focuses more on inter-subjective meanings and on the role of embedded ideas and 
norms in influencing state behaviour. This is not in line with what this study is attempting 
to achieve, which is assessing the effectiveness of NEPAD as a development tool. In 
                                                 
45
 Mingst, K.A Op. Cit. 63 
46
 Gilpin, R Op. Cit. 17 
47
 Goldstein, J. S. and Pevehouse, J. C.: International Relations (Seventh Edition), Pearson Longman, New 
York, 2006, p. 119. 
48
 Walt, S.M Op. Cit. 44 
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addition, constructivism is not a uniform theory. It lacks a theory of agency and it is a 
method more than anything else.
49
 Constructivism also focuses on objective reality and 
does not pay attention to material terms such as politics and economics.
50
 It begins from 
the principle that “there is an intimate and reciprocal connection between human subjects 
and the social world.”51 Its main focus is on human awareness and consciousness as well 
as its position in the international system.
52
 It rejects external, objective social reality and 
suggests that the international system does not exist on its own but only exists as an inter-
subjective consciousness among people.
53
 Consequently, the theory stresses the role of 
social organization and norms at the expense of the agents who in the first place are 
responsible for creating and changing them.
54
 Mingst argues that “if the world is in the 
eye of the beholder, then there will be no right or wrong answers, only individual 
perspectives.”55  
 
Unlike the above two, the dependency theory provides the greatest challenge to the 
hypothesis of the study. NEPAD‟s opponents suggest that the kind of partnership that the 
programme is seeking for will increase the dependency of Africa on rich nations. 
Therefore, one needs to consider the other side of the story of partnership from a 
dependency perspective in order to have a clear idea regarding the perceived criticisms of 
the NEPAD programme.  
 
In fact, the dependency theory arose in the 1960s and 1970s as a reaction to 
„modernization‟ theory, which establishes a causal link between industrialization and 
political development. In terms of the modernization theory, “all countries go through a 
similar set of economic stages of growth which eventually culminate in a fully 
                                                 
49
 Checkel, J.T.: “The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory” in World Politics, Vol. 50, 
No. 2, 1998, p. 323. 
50
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industrialized society.”56 In other words, economic interdependence is presented as an 
entirely win-win economic process that propels industrialization and the transformation 
of Third World economies into modern societies.
57
 The theory contains widely divergent 
approaches including Marxist and Structuralist views both of which strongly concerned 
about the expansion of the growing inequalities between North and South and the 
widening gap between rich and poor.
58
 It mainly suggests that a „centre‟-„periphery‟ 
relationship will continue to be characterized by the exploitation of the latter by the 
former.  
 
Dependency theory assumes that the periphery, which refers to the developing countries, 
is dependent on the institutional make-up of the international economic system. It 
emphasizes that the structural hierarchy of the world economy limits the role of state in 
the economy and threatens the autonomy of poor states to alter the impact of the world 
economy on their domestic structural arrangement.
59
 It claims that, in a world dominated 
by free market system, individual countries are subject to restructure their economy (e.g. 
through export-led growth policies, openness to FDI, free repatriation of profit) not in the 
interest of their people but in the interest of those who run the international system (the 
centre).
60
  
 
Another key position of the dependency theory is the idea that international capitalism 
under-develops Third World economies. Supporters of the dependency school of thought 
“base their model of development on the belief that foreign investment from core 
countries is harmful to developing „nation‟s long-term economic growth.”61 They argue 
that, “if surplus wealth is taken from the Third World by multinational corporations, the 
economic performance of developing countries suffers to the benefit of foreign capital.”62 
                                                 
56
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Also, dependency theory purports the idea that North-South economic partnerships is 
detrimental for the latter due to the intrinsic inequality between rich and poor caused by 
international capitalism.
63
 But, given the recent experience in Asia, industrialization 
through government supported FDI policies resulted in development.
64
 Evidence shows 
that part of the reasons behind the economic take off of East Asian economies was 
because they “structured their domestic economies in order to mitigate the pernicious 
effects of dependent relationships with core countries.”65 This brings the hypothesis of 
the dependency theory under scrutiny. Dependency theory can be lessened through 
specific government policy, like in East Asia.  
 
Having explained the relevance of the theory of liberalism in this study, and justified not 
using other theoretical perspectives (realism, constructivism and dependency) the next 
section will briefly explain the concept of “partnership” to reiterate on the role of 
NEPAD in promoting the liberal principle of economic cooperation and interdependence.  
 
3. The concept of partnership 
 
It has been argued that liberalism promotes „cooperation.‟ NEPAD also encourages 
cooperation through the formation of strategic partnership between Africa and its 
development partners. It is based on the idea that „partnership‟ between Africa and the 
developed world is a fundamental prerequisite to sustain economic growth.
66
  
 
The concept of partnership is not new in the history of international development. The 
term is present in key development reports such as: the Pearson Report of 1969, Partners 
in development; the Brandt Report of 1980, North-South: a programme for survival; the 
1996 Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization of Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) report, Shaping the 21ts century: the contribution 
of development co-operation; and in a number of donors and Non-Governmental 
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Organizations (NGOs) policy documents including the United Kingdom (UK) 
government‟s white paper of 1997, and the World Bank‟s Comprehensive Development 
Framework.
67
 The common theme across all these reports is centred around the concepts 
of „shared ideas‟ „trust‟, „transparency‟ dialogue‟, „frequent review‟ and a time line for 
implementation.
68
  
 
There are two common positions in the study of partnerships. The first “regards 
partnerships as a positive initiative, seeking to increase recipients' leadership in the 
design and implementation of development strategies.”69 This is the form of partnership 
that is supported by liberal theorists.  The second is the one related to the dependency 
theory, which “dismisses partnerships as little more than rhetoric, a disguise for the 
continued domination of the South, by the North.”70 The dependency theory seems to be 
correct as traditionally, partnership occurred along the line of a principal-agent 
relationship (donor-recipient) whereby the first holds power subjecting the latter to it.
71
 
Example of a partnership of this kind is that of the old North-South order championed by 
conditionality regimes like those of the 1980s IMF/World Bank Structural Adjustment 
Programme.  
 
However, this study stands in the definition of partnership as a mutual relationship, an 
agreement or pact between two development partners. It defines partnership as a power 
sharing agreement between two partners which articulates terminology like “common 
aim, vision, goals, mission, or interest, joint right, resources and responsibilities; 
autonomous and independent; equality and trust.”72 This definition clearly shifts away the 
idea of partnership from a „donor‟ - „recipient‟ relationship towards harmonizing 
relationship between Africa and the industrialized countries to achieve a shared goal of 
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development in the region. Under this relationship, aid recipients like African countries 
shall “advance their external commitments under mutual accountability (as opposed to 
conditionality) while external donors will expose their aid efforts to the critiques of their 
development partners.”73 This implies both partners to acknowledge that they have 
different objectives and that they are entitled to bring different capacity to the 
partnership. This also draws attention to “the need for mutual respect of each other 
partners‟ organization‟s mission, values, as well as agreements on the terms of the 
relationship.”74 NEPAD draws the parameters of its relationship with its development 
partners on similar basis of mutuality and fraternity.  
 
According to de Waal, at the heart of NEPAD‟s implementation lies the concept of 
„enhanced partnership‟ that promises to transform aid relationship.75 The „enhanced 
partnership' is “a common commitment by African countries and donors to a set of 
development outcomes (defined by African countries), whereby donors pool funds, 
guarantee them for an extended period and channel them through budgetary processes, 
which are then jointly monitored on the basis of outcomes.”76 Its purpose is to water 
down the costs associated with the receipt of aid, remove unnecessary and burdensome 
conditionalities, encourage African ownership of their development planning, and enable 
aid to promote democracy and guarantee best development outcomes.
77
 According to 
Hope, “the contemporary consensus on African cooperation is that development 
partnerships work best where the aid regime devolves delivery system empowers local 
communities and puts Africans in charge of their development efforts, while development 
partners recognizing and supporting Africa‟s leadership and responsibility.”78   
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NEPAD views partnership in development as an „international responsibility” to create a 
“world citizen.”79 This means NEPAD views African problems (e.g. poverty and 
underdevelopment) as global issues, which then need global responses. For instance, 
NEPAD frames its aims around the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 
challenging aid donors ('development partners') to take their commitment to global 
poverty reduction seriously and to open the door for a common project among 
development partners towards fulfilling these goals.
80
 This “provides the platform for 
Africa to bring to the table its contribution to the world – material and human resources, 
biodiversity, market and partner with the rest of the world on terms it considers 
acceptable.”81 
 
Yet, critics argue that NEPAD is not engaged in an equal partnership with its 
development partners. This is not surprising as the OECD currently defines partnership as 
“an informal association between donors and African countries.”82 Adedeji also states 
that “strategic partnership” as the pursuit of common interests and common policies 
poses doubt on its applicability between two unequal partners.
83
 He further states that it 
will be difficult for the continent of Africa to have a strategic partnership with the 
developed countries in the absence of a binding commitment, and argues:  
 
As long as the objective of the developed countries is to maintain their economic progress along the present 
lines, the relations between the North and South in general and Africa in particular will continue to be 
characterized by the domination of the strong over the weak, a drain of resources from the poor nations to 
the rich, and appropriation of an increasing share of the world‟s resources by those who are already 
prosperous. This is a travesty of co-operation, partnership and interdependence. This is more aptly 
described as feudo-imperial partnership and interdependence.
84
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Conversely, the closing paragraphs of the NEPAD document clearly outline the rules of 
the engagement of Africa with its development partners. For instance, section VI of 
NEPAD, entitled A New Global Partnership, speaks of the role which must be played by 
its development partners and by multilateral organizations, which are jointly described as 
Africa's 'development partners.'
85
 Therefore, it seems that NEPAD's partnership will 
involve Africa to partner with region of the world generally referred to as the West,
86
 on 
a mutual basis.  
 
Maxwell and Christiansen state that NEPAD foresees a formal (though contractual) 
engagement with its development partners.
87
 Thus paragraphs 152 and 186 of the 
NEPAD document respectively refer to “an independent mechanism for assessing donor 
and recipient country performance...and to „mutual agreed targets and standards for both 
donors and recipient.”88 NEPAD further lays out (in paragraph. 188) 13 'responsibilities 
and obligations of the developed countries and multilateral institutions', ranging from 
debt relief to market access and governance reform of the multilateral financial 
institutions, and talks about a coordinated peer review on the African nations by the 
Economic Commission for Africa (ECA); which also implies independent review of both 
donor and recipient country‟s performance.89  
 
In sum, partnership does not necessarily mean equality. It is rather a relationship, an 
association with common future and long-term interests, thus implying a sharing of 
burden and rewards.
90
 A genuine partnership however requires „mutual respect‟ and 
equality of power and influence.
91
 It also requires a shared ownership, power and 
commitment among the different partners governed by ethics and principles.  
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Also, the term partnership cannot be quantified and will therefore not be easy to measure. 
One could perhaps measure partnership in terms of the number of forums or meeting held 
by partners or the actions taken afterwards. Partnership could also be measured in terms 
of the level of political commitment or willingness amongst partners. Also, partnership is 
not an easy term to assess because it involves a lot of dimensions. It can deal with more 
than one issue including security, economics, politics, cultures, development...etc.  
 
Therefore, measuring the concept of partnership in light of the NEPAD programme 
would require an assessment of key sectoral priority areas of the programme. Addressing 
NEPAD‟s priorities (agriculture; environment; human resource development; and 
infrastructure capacity) necessitates huge and sustained resources mobilization from its 
development partners.
92
 “NEPAD‟s resource mobilization strategy implies that the bulk 
of the resources required to address priority projects are to come from external sources 
through debt relief, increased ODA and FDI, and improved access for African products to 
Northern markets.”93  
 
Resource mobilization involves two strategies: capital follows and market access 
initiatives. The first seeks to promote domestic resource mobilization, debt relief and 
cancelation, increased and reformed ODA, high private capital flows, and more FDI.
94
 
The second seeks to promote the diversification of Africa‟s economy while securing 
greater access to the market of rich nations in respects of agriculture, mining, 
manufacturing, tourism, and services.
95
  
 
In this background, the study assesses resources mobilization from developed NEPAD 
partners to developing NEPAD members through capital follows and market access 
initiatives to measure whether NEPAD as a partnership institution has been successful in 
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promoting trade and investment in Africa. The study will look at ODA and FDI as criteria 
to assess capital flows, and will use agriculture to assess market access.  
 
4. The concepts of “mutual accountability” and “mutual responsibility” 
 
The concept of mutual accountability and mutual responsibility are closely intertwined. 
Quoted in Haines, Bradley says: “we need make no distinction between responsibility, or 
accountability, and liability to punishment.”96 Haines views accountability as a 
significant aspect of responsibility. Accordingly, “responsibility even in the sense of 
„liability,‟ speaks of the person as accountable or liable rather than of his acts which 
constitute, on the contrary, the content of his liabilities.”97 Simply speaking, one is 
responsible for one's acts; but in terms of liability it is the person who is responsible.
98
 In 
this sense, responsibility carries more weight than accountability as the former involves 
liability.  
 
The term accountability has gained widespread attention in the development discourse as 
a necessary tool in democratization, participation and governance. Generally speaking, 
accountability “denotes the mechanisms through which people entrusted with power are 
kept under check to make sure that they do not abuse it, and that they carry out their 
duties effectively.”99 Accountability “manages the power relations between actors who 
interact or affect each other directly or indirectly.”100 It is also understood as „giving an 
account‟ to another party who has a stake in what has been achieved.101 It evokes the 
wisdom of taking responsibility and holds the sense of being „held responsible‟ or being 
„held to account.‟102 Therefore, “accountability is not only the means through which 
individuals and organizations are held responsible for their decisions, but also the means 
by which they take internal responsibility for shaping their organizational mission and 
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values, for opening themselves to external scrutiny and for assessing performance in 
relations to goals.”103 This raises the question of who is responsible, to whom, and for 
what?  
 
In the NEPAD debate, the term accountability is mostly used to assess aid donor 
practices. The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness states that mutual accountability in 
aid occurs when “donors and recipients carry out „mutual‟ assessments of progress in 
implementing agreed commitments and more broadly their development partnership.”104 
Speaking at the Africa-Canada Parliamentary Dialogue, Anne Makinda argues:  
 
Mutual accountability takes into account the fact that the policies and actions of both donor and recipient 
countries have an impact on the effectiveness of aid and on the outcomes of development efforts. It focuses 
on results-oriented development partnerships, commitments on both parties of the partnership, and an 
emphasis on systematic review and monitoring of the development programs.
105
  
 
According to Makinda, a genuine accountable aid processes requires an aid recipient 
country to have the ownership of the development agenda and the leadership of the 
implementation agenda, taking into account mutually acceptable practices from 
donors.
106
 It also implies enforcement mechanisms at a local level to ensure legitimacy 
amongst the agents involved in the implementation process of the partnership 
agreement.
107
 
 
NEPAD‟s partnership already contains the kind of accountability enforcement measure 
prescribed above. In 2003, NEPAD Heads of State and Government Implementation 
Committee (HSGIC) requested the ECA and the OECD to develop a mutual 
accountability process in which Africa and its OECD partners could track the 
implementation of their commitments to development progress in Africa.  This led to the 
launching of the Mutual Review Report, which “serves as a consultation mechanism 
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between Africa and OECD countries to assess and monitor progress in delivering on 
commitments and achieving goals.”108 
 
In defining the concept of responsibility there are two types: formal and substantive. 
“Substantive responsibility” refers to „responsibility for particular objects that commits 
an agent to particular deeds concerning them.”109 “Formal responsibility” however, refers 
to an instinct feeling of responsibility „instituted by nature.”110 This is also known as 
“natural responsibility" – the original and the strongest form of responsibility from which 
any other responsibility eventually derives its more or less contingent validity.
111
 
Example of such is parental responsibility which means that originally responsibility is a 
natural duty.  
 
In reality, none of these two kinds of responsibilities applies to the NEPAD partnership.  
Perhaps the basis of the „mutual responsibility‟ envisaged by NEPAD is one, which is 
contractual. A "contractual" responsibility “is one which is conditional a posteriori upon 
the fact and terms of the relationship actually entered into."
112
  
 
The terms “mutual accountability” and “mutual responsibility” are closely intertwined 
and cannot be measured in isolation.  These terms once again form the basis of the 
NEPAD‟s partnership. Under this regime, African countries shall reaffirm their 
commitment to good governance through peer review mechanism in return for aid and 
development assistance from their development partners including the G8 and the 
European Union (EU). In other words, Africa‟s commitment to conflict resolution, the 
strengthening of the continent‟s peacekeeping mechanism, the promotion of democracy 
and human rights shall be rewarded with outside assistance.
113
 This simply means that it 
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is in the responsibility of African countries to subject themselves to good governance in 
order to count on aid and development assistance from their development partners.  
 
Therefore, measuring “mutual accountability” and “mutual responsibility” within the 
framework of NEPAD implies an analysis of the explicit link that the programme makes 
between democracy, peace and security (or good governance) and development 
(measured in terms of FDI and ODA in this study). NEPAD itself measures compliance 
with good governance agenda through the APRM.  
 
Within the context of “mutual accountability” and “mutual responsibility”, NEPAD rests 
on the idea that if the continent is to mobilize development resources from its external 
partners, it will have to address fundamental internal governance issues such as the 
promotion of peace and security, compliance with standards of good governance, and 
regional cooperation and integration to the satisfaction of those external partners.
114
  
 
Governance simply means: “the management, appropriation and distribution of power, 
the sum of many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their 
common affairs.”115 It also means the creation of “well-functioning and accountable 
institutions which citizens regard as legitimate, in which they participate in decisions that 
affect their daily lives and by which they are empowered.”116  
 
The World Bank defines governance as “the manner in which power is exercised in the 
management of a country‟s economic and social resources for development.”117 The 
Bank describes the characteristics of good governance as all or some of the following: 
“an efficient public service; an independent judicial system and legal framework to 
enforce contracts; the accountable administration of public funds; and independent public 
auditor, responsible to a representative legislature; respect for the law and human rights at 
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all levels of government; a pluralistic institutional structure, and a free press.”118 Hills 
also defines good governance as “a system or process that stresses the managerial aspects 
of running institutions, managing resources, and establishing institutions within 
government.”119 He further says that “sound governance is based upon accountability, 
transparency, institutional capacity, popular involvement, and adherence to rule.”120 
 
In the NEPAD framework, good governance is divided into two sections: democracy and 
political governance; and economic and corporate governance. The first focuses on 
political and civil rights such as a multiparty political system of free and fair elections, an 
independent electoral body and inclusivity; human rights protection through the respect 
for the rule of law, freedom of speech and freedom of association; and gender balance in 
political representation and the redistribution of wealth.
121
 The second mainly deals with 
the institutional make up within which the public and private sector operate. It 
emphasizes state capacity “to promote economic growth and development through 
appropriate policy and regulatory frameworks for private sector-led growth, and to 
implement social programmes aimed at reducing poverty with a strong element of 
inclusive participation.”122  
 
In sum, the political, economic and institutional aspects of governance under the NEPAD 
framework are accessed via the APRM through a range of variables such as political 
rights and institutional effectiveness (e.g. the functioning of the legislature, judicial, and 
executive branches, as well as the non-governmental sector); economic management (e.g. 
macroeconomic management, public financial management and accountability, monetary 
and financial transparency, accounting and auditing systems, and regulatory oversight); 
and corporate governance among others.
123
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NEPAD‟s institutionalization process of good governance has become vital to mobilize 
resources from its development partners.
124
 At a country level, NEPAD introduces peer 
review mechanism to assess compliance with good governance. NEPAD is based on the 
idea of a trade-off: “in exchange for Africa‟s governing elites holding each other 
politically and economically accountable for responsible governance, the industrialized 
powers are asked to make commitment on greater ODA flows, FDI, market access for 
African goods, and debt relief and cancellation.”125 According to Sadie, the idea behind 
the APRM is for Africa to move away from donor-imposed conditionalitiy and towards 
mutual accountability with its development partners to achieve desired goals.
126
 In other 
words, NEPAD assumes that those donor agents will direct more resources to African 
countries that demonstrate a commitment to good governance.  
 
Therefore, by calling African countries to sign up for new voluntary governance 
commitments and practices to the reward of a more equitable and favourable trading 
system between Africa and its development partners, NEPAD seeks to create important 
niches involving the lessening of risk on the African continent in return for the reward of 
greater trade access and markedly stronger investment flow into the region.
127
 To find out 
if this holds true, the study will investigate Ghana‟s commitment to peer review (as a 
credibility test of good governance) to measure the concept of “mutual accountability” 
and “mutual responsibility.” Criteria to be used is the relationship between Ghana‟s 
commitment to democracy and political good governance as well as economic and 
corporate good governance (e.g. the functioning of the legislature, judicial, and executive 
branches, as well as the civil society sector; and macroeconomic management, public 
financial management, monetary and financial transparency, accounting and auditing 
systems, regulatory oversight, and corporate governance) and its effect on increased 
ODA, FDI. But for the sake of conceptual clarity and in-depth analysis, the study will 
focus on three components of good governance (the functioning of the legislature, 
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judicial, and executive branches; macroeconomic management and public financial 
management; and corporate governance) and their effect on greater ODA and FDI. The 
selection of these variables is also subject to the availability of information.  
 
The next section will look at two important incentives that NEPAD promotes to attract 
trade and investment into Africa. These are the promotion of inherent liberal traits such 
as democracy, peace, and security, and the strengthening of good governance.  
 
5. Understanding NEPAD’s link between of democracy, peace, and security  
 
Development is difficult in the absence of peace and security. Poor trade and investment 
climate in Africa for instance is partly due to ongoing conflict and persistent insecurity in 
the region. According to Gruzd, African leaders have learnt from their own experience 
that peace; security, democracy, good governance, human rights and sound economic 
management are preconditions for sustainable development.
128
 NEPAD also makes an 
explicit link between development, peace, security and governance. It is based on the 
principle that “there can be no development without peace and security, governance and 
stability, economic growth, and international cooperation.”129  
 
From the outset, the message is clear: African states reckon that peace promotes 
prosperity, while bad governance leads to conflict, which in turn retards development. 
NEPAD asserts that political stability and prosperity depend on security, fair international 
trade, and access to finance, sound public services and good governance.
130
 According to 
Venter and Neuland, the promotion of peace and security has been a top priority of 
NEPAD because the development of the African continent as well as the improvement of 
the lives of African people have been damaged and destroyed by conflict and 
insecurity.
131
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In addition to peace and security, NEPAD promotes the spread of democracy and good 
governance agenda in Africa. Democracy as understood in the developed countries is not 
only a source of peace and security but also a precondition for trade and investment 
cooperation. According to Chabal “democracy should reduce the scope for conflict and 
make good government more likely…good government should bring about the political 
stability, the institutional consolidation and the operation of the rule of law  that are 
universally seen as the necessary framework for investment.”132 To this end, NEPAD 
incorporates the APRM into its political landscape as a key instrument to monitor 
compliance with good governance and mutual accountability among its peer members.  
 
6. Strengthening good governance through peer review  
 
The APRM is the central mechanism used by NEPAD to monitor compliance with good 
governance agenda among its member countries. Peer review is “a commitment to self-
monitoring and accountability for promoting inclusive and constitutional government by 
relying upon peer pressure in which governments monitor each other.”133 Peer review is 
not original in Africa. It has been a common practice for years at governmental and non-
governmental level particularly among the OECD countries of Europe, North America 
and Asia. The mechanism has been understood as “the systematic examination and 
assessment of the performance of a state by other states (peer), by designated institutions, 
or by a combination of states and designated institutions.”134  
 
According to Mathoho, the purpose of a peer review is to encourage states to improve 
their policy-making capacities, adopt best practices, and comply with agreed standards 
and principles
135
 in order to affect political stability high economic growth, sustainable 
development and hasten sub-regional and regional economic integration.
136
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The APRM is neither a precondition for debt relief or development assistance nor an 
economic rescue plan to attract foreign investment. It is rather a voluntary self-imposed 
assessment through which member countries master “the impact of their domestic 
policies on both internal political stability and economic growth, as well as on 
neighbouring countries.”137 The APRM therefore encourages countries to promote 
compliance with best practice and mutual responsibility.  
 
Critics of the APRM argue that the mechanism is not a democratic process. This follows 
allegation that African people are not fully represented in the APRM process. Critics also 
say that the political system context of socio-economic development of Africa “has been 
characterized by an over-centralization of power and impediments to the effective 
participation of the overwhelming majority of the people.”138 However, Landsberg argues 
that “democracy and political governance base of the APRM is fundamentally concerned 
with „measuring popular participation‟ and „political equality.‟ ”139 For him, NEPAD 
assesses this under several areas including the provision of equal citizen rights; 
accountable and representative institutions; vibrant civil society; prevention and 
reduction of intra-and inter-state conflict; the protection of economic, social and cultural 
rights; the separation powers…etc.140 
 
Many have conceived the APRM as one of the positive innovations of NEPAD. The 
APRM seeks to ameliorate the standards of governance and economic management in 
Africa in order to improve the living conditions of African people by promoting an 
environment that will attract investment and make development happen.
141
 It also strives 
to enhance African “ownership” of its development and governance agenda; to identify, 
evaluate and disseminate “best practice”; and to monitor progress towards previously 
agreed governances‟ goals.142  
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So far, peer review is already underway in the African continent. At least 26 African 
countries are signatory members to the APRM. While three reviews - Ghana, Kenya and 
Rwanda - are finished; Mauritius, South Africa, Lesotho and Tanzania are in the process 
of doing so.
143
  
 
7. Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, this chapter has endeavoured to explain why liberalism best helps respond 
to the central research question. The chapter has also defined the concept of “partnership” 
and the idea of “mutual accountability” and “mutual responsibility” as crucial to 
assessing NEPAD‟s success. It has particularly conceptualized the term partnership 
around the idea of economic cooperation and interdependence which are important 
aspects of the liberal paradigm. It has shown that, while liberalism views partnership or 
cooperation between Africa and the industrial world as a positive sum-game, dependency 
theory sees it as an instrument to increase the overreliance of the centre (the North) on the 
periphery (the South).  
 
However, it has been found out that NEPAD partners with its development partners on a 
contractual basis. NEPAD is a mutual agreement, which requires African countries to 
respect the value of democratic good governance in return for resource mobilization and 
market access from their development partners. To show compliance with this agreement, 
NEPAD makes a causal link between democracy, peace and security, and promotes good 
governance through peer review mechanisms.  
 
Clearly, NEPAD‟s partnership does not amount to aid conditionality. It rather amounts to 
a moral commitment between Africa and the industrial world. But, given the fact that 
NEPAD‟s partnership is not a binding commitment, the challenge ahead is to find out 
how „genuine‟ and realistic this relationship is and how does it pave the way from 
rhetoric to implementation. This issue will be looked at in the next chapter. 
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This chapter has further explained how NEPAD promotes foreign trade and investment 
flows into Africa. It has shown that, NEPAD‟s commitment to partnership, good 
governance, APRM, democracy and peace and security can ameliorate the trade and 
investment climate of Africa to affect economic growth and development in the region. 
The chapter has also clarified the types of criteria that are going to be used to measure 
“mutual partnership”, “mutual accountability” and “mutual responsibility.” 
 
The next chapter will attempt to assess the issue of resource mobilization through capital 
flows and market access in order to measure the effectiveness of the idea of partnership 
endorsed by the NEPAD programme. This will also help analysing the extent to which 
NEPAD has contributed in attracting foreign trade and investment into Africa.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 37 
Chapter 3: Assessment of the concept of “mutual partnership”: a reflection of 
NEPAD’s resource mobilization strategy 
 
1. Introduction 
 
There have been a number of international pledges to mobilize resources for development 
in Africa. These include the MDGs which require $40 to $60 billion in additional aid to 
Africa, and the target of 0.7 % of GDP from EU members as ODA to the continent.
144
 
NEPAD calls for an additional capital flows of 12 % of GDP or about $64 billion per 
annum to Africa to meet an annual economic growth target of 7 % per annum for all the 
participating countries by the year 2015.  
 
The main purpose of these pledges is among other things to materialize NEPAD‟s 
ambition to alleviate poverty and underdevelopment in Africa which requires huge 
resource mobilization from both domestic sources and a bulk of resources from outside 
the continent. NEPAD first recognizes that financing for development must come from 
domestic revenues. But, given low income and poor domestic savings in the region, the 
bulk of finance for development will have to come from abroad in the form of FDI and 
ODA. “In the short and mid-term, additional inflows are expected from aid and higher 
level of debt relief, while in the longer term private capitals are expected to take up the 
slack.”145 Thus, NEPAD‟s idea of mobilizing resources from its development partners is 
a complement to domestic efforts of financing for development.
146
  
 
This chapter aims to measure NEPAD‟s success in this sectoral priority of resource 
mobilization which includes the scramble for more capital flows and market access for 
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African economies. The conceptualization of the resource mobilization strategy (RMS) of 
NEPAD is clearly outlined in the diagram below.  
 
Diagram 1: Conceptualization of the RMS of NEPAD  
 
 
See also Moyo, T
147
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The unique contribution of this chapter to the central research question is clear. In 
assessing NEPAD‟s resource mobilization strategy through capital flows and market 
access, the chapter answers whether NEPAD as a mutual partnership programme has 
been successful in attracting foreign trade and investment into Africa. Thus, the chapter is 
a true reflection of the desire to focus on the concept of “mutual partnership.” The idea of 
analysing the success of NEPAD in Africa as a whole before looking at Ghana (the case 
study) is to stick with the deductive method of argument that the study aims to follow.  
On capital flow, the chapter focuses on how FDI and ODA flows into Africa have 
evolved since the establishment of NEPAD and the factors that have contributed to that 
development. These include adherence to market-led policy reforms, partnerships with 
the industrialized world, as well as improvement in the political conditions of Africa. 
Although the flow of capital to Africa has substantially increased if not doubled after the 
adoption of NEPAD, the chapter argues that despite that increase, Africa still receives the 
lowest share in net capital flow comparing to other developing regions. On the issue of 
market access, the chapter focuses on the evolution of trade in agriculture in Africa after 
NEPAD. It will find that, Africa is suffering from supply constraints to access the market 
of its development partners. But a specific program called the Comprehensive Africa 
Agriculture Development Program (CAADP) has been established by NEPAD to address 
this matter and work is so far in progress though at a slow rate.  
 
The chapter also encloses a section on two major contributions made by NEPAD to 
improve the trade and investment climate of Africa. NEPAD endeavours to change the 
perception of Africa as a high risk zone for trade and investment and to bridge the 
infrastructural gap of Africa through Public-Private sector Partnership (PPP). These two 
issues are of crucial importance for the mobilization of resources to Africa.  
 
2. Exploring the capital flow initiative (CFI) of NEPAD 
 
“A basic principle of the Capital Flows Initiative is that improved governance is a necessary requirement 
for increased capital flows, so that participation in the Economic and Political Governance Initiative is a 
prerequisite for participation in the Capital Flows Initiative” (para 147 of the NEPAD Document).  
 40 
Paragraph 154 of the NEPAD document speaks about its strategy to allure capital flows 
into Africa. It refers to three major priorities which include (1) addressing investors‟ 
perception of Africa as a high risk zone through initiatives relating to peace and security, 
political and economic governance, infrastructure and poverty reduction; (2) the 
implementation of PPP capacity-building programme through the African Development 
Bank (AfDB) and other regional development institutions, to assist national and sub-
national governments in structuring and regulating transactions in the provision of 
infrastructural and social services; and (3) to promote the deepening of financial markets 
within countries, as well as cross-border harmonization and integration, via a Financial 
Market Integration Task Force which will initially focus on the legislative and regulatory 
environment for the financial system. 
 
Capital flow is an urgent need for the development of Africa. According to the 2002 
Global Poverty Report (a joint report by the international financial institutions and the 
AfDB), for the 30 or so African countries that have the capacity to use external assistance 
effectively, an annual increases of ODA of between $20-25 billion – from the then level 
of $13 billion – would be required.148 It is for these kinds of reason that NEPAD, in its 
CFI, has stressed the importance of (i) raising levels of ODA; (ii) reducing the debt of 
African countries to sustainable levels; and (iii) increasing foreign private capital flows 
through both direct and portfolio investment.
149
 
 
NEPAD‟s CFI encompasses four thematic areas: increasing domestic resource 
mobilization through savings, investment and tax reforms; debt relief and debt 
cancellation; increasing ODA; and attracting more FDI. In terms of ODA reforms, the 
thrust of NEPAD is basically to increase collaboration with the G8, create an institutional 
mechanism to monitor ODA flows and harmonize the positions of donors and 
                                                 
148
 Fall, A.: Issues Relating to Capital Flows in Africa: the African Development Bank Perspective,  paper 
presented at a Joint UNITAR/MEFMI Regional Workshop on Legal Aspects of Public Debt Negotiations 
for Government Officials and Central Bankers from Eastern and Southern Africa, Luanda, Angola - 24 to 
28 March 2003, p. 2. 
http://www2.unitar.org/dfm/AssessmentReport2003/Luanda/Unpublished/Capital_Flows_Africa.pdf 
149
 Fall, A Loc cit. 2-3 
 41 
recipients.
150
 On FDI reform, “the task is to change the perception of Africa as a „high 
risk‟ investment zone, promote more investment friendly legislation, canvas for increased 
ODA and debt reduction and create PPPs to assist governments in facilitating private 
capital investment.”151  
 
Capital flow is composed into FDI and portfolio investment. It takes the form of FDI 
when investors have a lasting management interest (typically 10 % or more of the voting 
power) in the foreign company. On the other hand, “portfolio investment flows include 
portfolio debt flows (e.g. domestic bonds purchased by foreign investors) and non-debt-
creating portfolio equity flows (such as country funds, depository receipts and direct 
purchases of shares by foreign investors).”152 The role played by NEPAD in improving 
FDI inflows into Africa is the subject matter of the next section.  
 
3. The case of FDI: its roles in economic growth and development  
 
FDI plays a prominent role in the economic growth and development of developing 
countries particularly the marginalized Africans.  It provides that much capital needed for 
investment, it boosts competition in the recipient country industries, and through trade, 
technology and knowledge transfer as well as improvement in human/or physical 
capitals, it helps indigenous firms to increase production and to integrate into the global 
economy.
153
 The advantages of FDI also include serving as a source of capital, creating 
employment, facilitating market access and the creation of a spill over phenomenon to 
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local firms in terms of technology and efficiency.
154
 FDI is also crucial for introducing 
widespread technological change, complementing domestic investment, improving 
competition within firms, and providing access to skills and global markets.
155
 
 
Within the context of the development debate, FDI can be a stimulus plan for growth. In 
the African context, it is mainly a remedy for two chronic issues affecting the continent 
notably the savings gap and the shortage of technology and skills. So, the importance of 
FDI in Africa is not just to accumulate financial capital but also to improve the 
managerial and technological know-how that can help productivity to grow.
156
   
 
The importance of FDI as a source of capital is reflected in the NEPAD document. 
Paragraph 150 of NEPAD notes that, “NEPAD seeks to increase private capital flows to 
Africa, as an essential component of a sustainable long-term approach to filling the 
resource gap.”157 NEPAD acknowledges the importance of FDI for African economies. It 
perceives it as a tool to translate its vision for economic growth and development into 
reality.
158
 This is because like many other developing countries, Africans lack domestic 
savings to finance growth and development. Therefore, to fill its savings gap, Africa 
became reliant on external revenues (including FDI) from its development partners.  
 
Also, within a market-led approach to growth and development like NEPAD, FDI should 
certainly provide the bulk of capital needed to fill the resource gap of Africa. NEPAD 
encourages Africa to make use of other external resources particularly FDI to alleviate 
poverty and underdevelopment. Therefore, filling the annual resource gap of US$64 
billion (as projected by NEPAD) necessary to meet the MDGs of reducing poverty by 
half by 2025 requires a substantial increase in FDI. The next section determines whether 
FDI conditions have improved after the adoption of NEPAD. 
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3.1 Recent Trends in FDI to Africa  
 
In the late 1990s prior to the adoption of NEPAD Africa faced a steady decline in FDI. 
However, after the adoption of NEPAD, the share of FDI in Africa has gradually 
increased. FDI to Africa has for instance increased from a lower level of 10.3% in 2002; 
to 18.6% in 2005 though it declined to 15.7 % in 2006 (see Table 2). Nonetheless, 
although the amount of FDI to Africa has increased substantially in recent years, its share 
still remains the lowest compared to other regions. In other words, there has been a 
steady improvement in the level of FDI to Africa yet its share comparing to other regions 
has not significantly improved.  
 
Figure 1: Annual FDI inflows to Africa prior NEPAD (US$ billions) 
 
Source: World Investment Report (UNCTAD 2001) 
 
In fact, Africa experienced a poor performance in terms of FDI before the establishment 
of NEPAD. When comparing to all developing countries (excluding China) Africa‟s 
share of FDI decrease from 7.7% between 1995 and 1997 to 4.6% in 2000 (see Figure 1). 
To add, the continent received a margin of 1.4% of the world DFI between 1995 and 
2000.
159
 The reasons behind this poor performance are complex. First, most countries in 
Africa had thin financial market and were not able to raise capital from international 
capital market.
160
 For example, South Africa alone received almost all portfolio 
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investment in the region ($8.6 billion) in 1998.
161
 Also, African countries tended to be 
less open than other developing economies; and were perceived by foreign investors as 
high risk zone. This led the region to be left behind others in terms of FDI.  
 
Second, while FDI in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) increased substantially in the 1990s, its 
growth rate as compared to other developing regions was relatively meagre. Between 
1980-89 and 199-99, FDI in SSA grew by 218% comparing to an increase of 990%, 
560% and 789% for East Asia, Latin America and South Asia respectively.
162
 
Consequently, Africa‟s share of FDI to developing countries declined from 19% in the 
1970s, to 9% in the 1980s and to about 3% in the 1990s.
163
  
 
The picture has relatively improved in recent years after NEPAD. For instance, even 
though Africa continues to have the lowest share in global capital flows, its FDI situation 
doubled between 2000 and 2004 from 3.8% to 6.8% (see Table 1). Table 1 explains the 
regional distribution of net private capital flows to developing countries after the year 
2001. It shows that net private capital flows to developing countries rose from about $41 
billion in 1990 to reach $301 billion in 2004. FDI contributed to the largest share of this 
increase accounting for $165.5 billion in 2004, while portfolio flows accounted to $26.8 
billion in 2004. FDI (which increased from $1.3 billion in 1990 to 17.1 billion in 2004) 
also accounted for a large share in net capital flows in Africa. Portfolio investment which 
had been marginal comparing to FDI at the beginning of 1990s increased to US$3.5 
billion in 2004 as well.
164
 
 
Yet, the region still remained largely on the margins of the boom in private capital flows 
that occurred in the early 2000.
165
 Its share of net capital flows to developing countries 
was only 5.7 % compared with 34.4 %, 34.3 % and 17.8 % for East Asia, Europe and 
Central Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean respectively and its share of FDI was 
only 6.8 % compared with 38.4 %, 22.7 % and 25.6 % in the same order. Likewise, the 
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investment ratio is relatively below the average figures of East Asia (34.4) and South 
Asia (31%).
166
 
 
Table 1: Regional distribution of net capital flows to developing countries (1990-
2004) 
 
Source: World Bank (2005): Global Development Finance: Mobilizing Finance and Managing 
Vulnerability‟, World Bank, Washington DC 
 
By 2006, FDI inflows to Africa broke another record of 20% increase reaching US$ 36 
billion.
167
 Private capital flows also rose to US$ 25 billion (excluding remittance which 
accounted for US$35 billion). In the same year, Africa also saw a significant increase in 
net capital flows from US$13 billion in 2002 to over US$ 60 billion in 2006 ( North 
Africa: US$ 3 billion to US$ 26 billion; sub-Saharan Africa: US$ 10 billion to 36 billion) 
(see also Table 2). Within this, FDI accounted for US$ 35.5 billion while the ration of 
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investment to GDP rose from 17% in 2000 to over 20% in 2006.
168
 This indicates that 
foreign investments into Africa have being increasing over yeas after NEPAD came into 
being.  
 
Table 2: Regional Distribution of Net Private Capital Flows to Africa 
(US$ billion) 
 
Sources: UNCTAD, World Investment Report (2007) and World Bank, Global Development Finance 
(2007 
 
Finally, despite the recent global financial meltdown, FDI inflows to Africa yet broke 
another record high of $88 billion in 2008 resulting in an increase of FDI stock in the 
region to US$ 511 billion (see also Figure 2).
169
 The increase also occurred in four of the 
five sub regions of the continent. According to  UNCTAD “North Africa attracted 27% 
of the FDI to the region in 2008, compared with 36% in 2007; and the 47 countries of 
sub-Saharan Africa attracted 73% in 2008, up from 64% in 2007.”170 This sustained but 
slightly high FDI increase “led to an increase in the regions‟ share of global FDI to 5.2%, 
as compared with 3.5% in 2007, and raised its FDI stock by 20%.”171 
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In addition to improvement in total FDI, there has also been a new development in recent 
years in terms of reversing inequality in FDI within African countries. Previously, FDI to 
Africa were significantly driven by “natural resource development, as has been the case 
with oil countries such as Angola, Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea.”172 The extractive 
industries in these countries accounted for most of the increase in FDI inflows. In 
addition to resource rich countries, the bulk of FDI inflows to Africa have also been 
largely concentrated in industrialized countries such as South Africa. 
 
Conditions have improved so far in terms of diversifying FDI destination. According to 
UNCTAD, FDI inflows rose in 40 out of 53 countries in Africa in 2004.
173
 In addition to 
investment in the resources sector, FDI to Africa include manufacturing, tourism and 
services in that year. But given the scarcity of information/data, the chapter is only going 
to explore the manufacturing sector.  
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Figure 2: FDI inflows, by value and as a percentage of 
gross fixed capital formation, by region, 1995-2008 
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Conditions have also improved so far in terms of diversifying the sector of investment in 
Africa which is an important aspect of the capital flow initiative of NEPAD. UNCTAD 
statistics show that in 2006, FDI accounted for an important share of the total investment 
in several non-oil producing countries. In Egypt and Morocco (the top African FDI 
recipients of the year), non-oil industries such as agriculture, communication, 
manufacturing, baking and tourism received most of FDI inflows. As shown in Table 3 
“with one or two exceptions, these countries tend to be better managed, highlighting the 
importance of improving the investment climate and overall governance.”174 Therefore, 
while the extractive industries continue to attract most FDI, countries that govern justly 
are equally likely to benefit from foreign investment.   
 
Table 3 FDI inflows as Share of Gross Fixed Capital Formation in Selected Non-Oil 
Producing Countries, 2006 
 
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2007. 
 
3.2 The leading factors of FDI improvement in Africa after NEPAD 
 
The causes of FDI improvement in Africa are numerous. In the 1990s, rising prices of 
commodities including oil explained the growth of FDI. But in 2008 “buoyant global 
growth and low interest rates”175 were the leading factors to high FDI in Africa. 
However, evidence in 2006 shows that some of these FDI inflows were driven by 
preferential access to developed-country markets through initiatives like the African 
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growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) of the U.S. and the Everything but Arms (EBA) 
initiative of the EU.
176
 This suggests that the liberal notion of free trade does also lead to 
high FDI which has been the case in Africa over the recent period.  
 
In broad terms, policy reforms, adherence to market-led policies and partnership with 
development partners through NEPAD are major contributing factors to the improvement 
of FDI in Africa over the last eight years. Many African countries have so far adopted 
different policy measures and incentives in line with NEPAD to improve investment 
climate in Africa. This included such measures as the adoption of a new investment code 
to attract foreign investors in Burundi; the establishment of various free industrial zones 
in Egypt; the privatization of a number of utilities in Kenya; the ratification of 
competition legislation and restrictions on monopolies and collusion in Mauritius; and on 
the other hand the introduction of a new tax regime raising the tax rate in the mining 
industry from 31.7% to 47% in Zambia.
177
  
 
After the adoption of NEPAD, African countries are now in favour of openness to trade 
and foreign investment.  According to UNCTAD, of the 53 regulatory changes observed 
by UNCTAD in Africa in 2005, 42 were favourable to FDI, while 11 made the 
environment less favourable.
178
 In 2007, African countries introduced significant FDI-
related policy and institutional reforms at both national and regional levels. Their 
development partners including major home countries, and regional multilateral entities, 
also took significant steps that have influenced FDI inflows into Africa.
179
  Together with 
NEPAD, they have established an African Investment Initiative and have teamed up to 
change the risky investment climate of Africa. 
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3.3 Role of NEPAD in high FDI in Africa: the NEPAD African Investment 
Initiative and partnership with development partners to improve the 
investment risk perception of Africa 
 
NEPAD has been a catalyst platform in mobilizing resources to Africa for development. 
It plays a leading role in bringing more FDI influx into the region. Perhaps the most 
important mechanism created by NEPAD to attract FDI to Africa is the establishment of 
the African Investment Initiative and the building of PPP for infrastructure development.    
 
NEPAD seeks to change the perception of Africa as a high-risk continent in terms of 
foreign investment. It sees the need to increase private capital flows to Africa as “an 
essential component of a sustainable long-term approach to filling the resource gap.” 
Doing so requires actions to address risk perception, building PPP, and deepening capital 
markets.
180
  
 
Political instabilities in some African countries affect investor sentiments. They have for 
instance led FDI inflows to decline from a peak of $17 billion in 2001 to $6 billion in 
2002.
181
 Macroeconomic uncertainty or instability also constitutes a high perception of 
risk which is not favourable to both domestic and foreign investors. On the contrary, 
macroeconomic stability yields to attractiveness in investment in general and an 
expansion of FDI in particular.
182
  
 
The international community including NEPAD‟s development partners have taken 
various steps to support Africa‟s developmental endeavours. These include micro-
finance, assistance for institutions in private sector development, and support for 
structural reforms to improve the business environment. Specific actions to address the 
investment climate include “the Enhanced Private Sector Assistance (EPSA) for Africa, 
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the Foreign Investment Advisory Service of the International Finance Corporation, the 
NEPAD/OECD Africa Investment Initiative, and the Investment Climate Facility.”183 
 
More broadly, “the international community has stepped up its support for infrastructure, 
which is also a key to attracting more investment, in particular through the Infrastructure 
Consortium for Africa” (ICA).184 “The ICA is one of the major outcomes of the G8 
response to the NEPAD infrastructure development programme. The Consortium, which 
was inaugurated in October 2005, is a major effort among donors to accelerate progress 
to meet the urgent infrastructure needs.”185 These initiatives have led to a significant 
improvement in the investment climate of Africa.  
 
Box 1 explains the role of the NEPAD/OECD African Investment Initiative in reducing 
the investment risk perception in Africa. The purpose of the NEPAD-OECD Africa 
Investment Initiative is to support African countries to improve their investment climate 
by identifying obstacles, facilitating regional co-operation and implementing economic 
reforms. It is the largest regional policy forum on investment in Africa which is 
supported by a range of international, regional and industry partners which all bring 
specific expertise in country review and reforms.
186
 The project mainly addresses the 
challenge of infrastructure gap in Africa to impact positively on trade and investment.  
 
Overall, investment climate has so far improved in Africa over the last couple of years. 
Africa has taken major steps to improve its investment climate through stable 
macroeconomic environment, progress towards reforming economic policies and towards 
reducing the complexity and cost of regulation, and improving transparency and tackling 
corruption. Africa scored “the third-fastest region in terms of reforming its economic 
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regulations in 2005. Three African countries featured among the top 10 reformers for 
2006/07 in the World Bank‟s latest „Doing Business‟ survey.”187 Even so, the cost of 
doing businesses in the region still remains the highest in the world.  
 
Box 1: NEPAD/OECD African Investment Initiative 
 
Source: UNCTAD (WIR03)  
 
In spite of considerable improvement in the investment climate in many African countries 
in recent years, the region still faces a series of obstacles, some of them policy related and 
others structural. This includes poor infrastructure, unskilled labour force, weak 
regulatory environment, and inefficiency of government bodies which all increase the 
cost of doing business in the region, thus deterring foreign capital.
188
   
 
Evidence suggests that for a country to become an investment destination it must improve 
“the structure and administration of taxes and investment regulations, the legal, judicial 
and financial systems, administrative „red‟ tape and corruption which are all significant in 
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raising the cost of doing business.”189 Also, FDI flows are mostly determined by the size 
of the regional economy, the size of the population and its purchasing power, risk and 
macroeconomic uncertainly, administrative barriers, and underdeveloped financial capital 
markets which are yet to be addressed in some African countries.
190
  
 
Africa is not doing well in terms of lowering the cost of doing business in the region 
which continues to remains the highest in the world. This poses a lot of challenges to 
entrepreneurs who want to invest in the region. They find themselves in the middle of 
greater regulatory and administrative burdens, less protection of property and investor 
rights, than entrepreneurs elsewhere in the world, and above all of these, they face 
inadequate infrastructure which in many cases reduces their return to investment.
191
 “The 
World Bank, for example, estimates the infrastructure constraint on doing business 
reduces the productivity of Africa‟s firms by as much as 40%.”192 Also, “the lack of 
sufficient and reliable transport and energy infrastructure not only reduces business-
efficiency, it also limits the volume of regional and international trade and hampers 
regional integration.”193 NEPAD addresses this issue through partnership with its 
development partners to bridge the infrastructural gap in Africa to further improve the 
flow of capital into the region.  
 
Therefore, back to the concept of mutual partnership, one could then argue that, Africa 
has attained substantial progress after the formation of NEPAD which has encouraged its 
development partners to increase FDI inflows into the region. For instance, partnership 
between Africa and its development partners occurred particularly along the line of the 
NEPAD/OECD African Investment Initiative and the creation of PPP for infrastructure 
development in response to policy reforms, improvement in macroeconomic stability, 
                                                 
189
  Mlambo, K Op. Cit. 565 
190
 Ibid. 561-62 
191
 Africa Progress Panel: Annual Report of the Africa Progress Panel 2009: An Agenda for Progress at a 
Time of Global Crisis: a Call for African Leadership, Geneva, 2009, p. 12. 
http://www.africaprogresspanel.org/EN/publications/AnnualReport2009/20090610-
APP2009_Annual_Report_EN.pdf 
192
 Loc cit 
193
 Loc cit 
 54 
risk perception, investment climate, openness to trade and investment and overall 
governance in Africa.  
 
Having explained the changing dynamics of FDI in Africa after NEPAD what remains to 
be highlighted now is how ODA flows have evolved since 2001.  
 
4. The case of ODA: its role in economic growth and development  
 
In general, the purpose of aid has long been to invest in projects such as infrastructural 
development, the expansion of social services, research and development.
194
 In Africa, 
foreign aid is vital to finance several types of activities including discrete investment 
projects; technical assistance; budget deficit through macroeconomic and reform 
programs; and external debt services.
195
 ODA also constitutes a substantial share of the 
budgets of many African countries.  
 
There is a positive correlation between high aid and high growth. Africa is transiting 
from low aid-negative growth to high aid-positive growth. A study conducted by the 
AfDB found that from 1995 to 2004 “ the number of countries occupying the low aid-
negative growth stratum has fallen from 15 to 5 countries, whereas high aid-high growth 
performing countries have increased from 5 to 12 countries.”196 NEPAD‟s growth and 
good governance initiative as well as its support to the MDGs are among the factors that 
have likely led to improved ODA flows into Africa. 
 
4.1 Assessing Aid commitments to Africa 
 
NEPAD has promoted a number of international partnership agreements to increase ODA 
to Africa since its establishment. First, substantial commitments were made by the 
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international community at Monterey in March 2002 and latter in Kananaskis to increase 
ODA by a total of US$ 12 billion per year by 2006. The initiative further purposed “to 
improve aid effectiveness, reduce the burden of aid management, and to assist eligible 
countries through the HIPCs debt relief initiative.” 197  
 
Second, additional commitments were made by the G8 and the EU to increase aid 
commitment to Africa in 2005. The G8 agreed to cancel 100 % of outstanding debt of 
eligible Heavy Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) to financial institutions like the IMF, 
and the AfDB, and to provide additional resource to ensure that the financing capacity of 
the international financial institutions would not be expected from principal repayments 
on the forgiven debt.
198
 “This is worth US$40 billion and could reach US$550 billion as 
more countries qualify.”199 The commitment includes 18 of the world‟s poorest countries, 
most of which are in Africa.  
 
On the other hand, commitment by the EU to increase ODA to Africa was made via the 
OECD. The latter predicts that total aid levels in 2010 will be $128 billion, an increase of 
$48.5 billion over 2004 level.”200 In terms of this pledge, the EU member countries 
committed to spend 0.7% of their annual GDP on aid by 2015, and to double its aid 
commitments by 2010 by providing an additional $40 billion with a new interim 
collective target of 0.56% ODA/GNI by 2010.
201
  The EU 2015 target include an interim 
collective target of 0.56% in 2010, and nearly double its ODA from euro 34.5 billion to 
67 billion with at least half of these increases going to Africa.
202
 As a result of these 
commitments, ODA flow to Africa has increased in relative terms over the recent period. 
The increase has been at a slow rate though and this is mainly because most of the ODA 
inflows went on debt relief and debt cancellation.  
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Development assistance to the region rose from US$16.4 billion in 2001 to US$40.7 
billion in 2006, following donors‟ commitment to their Monterey pledge and major 
progress on debt relief. Significant commitments have also been made by donors in the 
area of debt relief and debt cancellation under the HIPCs and the Multilateral Debt relief 
initiative (MDRI). Under the MDRI, lending agencies such as IMF and AfDB would 
provide 100 % debt relief on eligible debt to countries that had completed the HIPCs 
initiative.
203
 The HIPCs was established in 1996 to reduce the debt burden of eligible 
countries while in addition to this the MDRI was launched in 2005 to provide additional 
resources to help them meet the MDGs.  
 
Furthermore, development assistance including debt relief to SSA increased from 
US$13.9 billion to US$37.7 billion over the same period.
204
 Of the 26 countries 
benefiting from the HIPCs initiative, 22 are from Africa, and this initiative is now 
yielding more than US$800 million in cash savings for African countries. Discussions 
included the call for HIPCs to show good governance, prudent new borrowing and good 
debt management, as debt relief alone cannot guarantee fiscal solvency, long-term 
economic growth and social development.
205
  
 
The G8 in particular have fully complied with the commitments they made at Gleneagles 
to cancel all debts owed by eligible HIPCs to IMF, IDA, and the AfDB. However, “while 
donors have made significant progress in meeting commitments on debt relief, they have 
made relatively less effort in fulfilling the pledges made on scaling-up aid and improving 
aid effectiveness.
206
  
 
To add, only few countries have met their 0.7 % GNI ratio of ODA commitment. In 
2004, the average ratio for DAC members was 0.26 percent. While countries like 
Denmark, Luxemburg, the Netherland, Norway, and Sweden met their target, Belgium, 
France, Portugal, and Switzerland made significant progress but failed to meet their 
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target.
207
 The G8 Research group at the University of Toronto, Canada, described the 
group‟s commitment to aid plea as work in progress.208 One of the reason why G8 
countries as a group have not fully complied with commitments to scale-up aid to Africa 
is that some of them have not made much progress in following through on their 
commitments to double ODA to Africa while others who have made much progress in 
their commitment such as the U.S.A have not made enough commitment to double their 
aid to Africa by 2010.
209
  
 
So, while development partners have partially committed to their aid commitment, the 
HIPCs initiative has absorbed most of it. As a result, aid policy to Africa remains 
intangible. This means, it becomes difficult to assess whether mutual partnership between 
Africa and their development partners in terms of ODA has been accomplished. This is 
partly due to the fact that, the modest increase in ODA to Africa after NEPAD has by and 
large serviced debt cancelation.  
 
4.2 Trends in ODA 
 
Figure 3 below shows that historically, ODA flows were largely concentrated in 
emerging economies such as East Asia. In Africa, the trends have changed since the 1979 
oil shock and further improved particularly after NEPAD. Africa now accounts for a 
significant share in ODA. Africa‟s share of ODA rose from 27% from 1993 – 1994 to 36 
percent during the period of 2003 to 2004 while other regions enjoyed less than 25% in 
the same period (see figure 3.3).
210
 This positive performance has yielded to economic 
growth and development in the region. Figure 4 also shows that “total ODA to SSA 
reached a peak of $19 billion in 1992 and declined for most of the 1990s. The trend in per 
capita ODA also follows similar pattern.”211 The figure also show that despite poor 
performance in ODA to Africa from 1990 to the year 2000, Africa started to witness 
some improvement in ODA right after the year 2001.  
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Figure 3: Regional distribution of ODA (% of total disbursements) 
 
Source: World Bank 2006.and ERA 2007 
 
As far as aid for infrastructure development is concerned, the Commission for Africa 
Report deriving from the NEPAD programme sets targets for financing for investment in 
infrastructure in Africa at US$ 20 billion, representing nearly 30 percent of the total 
resource requirement for growth.
212
 In terms of ODA, the Commission has called for 
immediate doubling of aid up to $50 billion per annum and for 100 % debt 
cancellation.
213
 
 
Figure 4: ODA to sub-Saharan Africa ($US million)  
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Source World Bank 2006 and ERA 2007 
 
Figure: 5 ODA Flow to Africa 1990-2008 
 
Source: OECD/DAC statistics (2006), Draft Annex to chapter III of the ECA/OECD/DAC “Mutual Review 
of Development Effectiveness in Africa in the context of NEPAD”, Paris. 
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These calls have received increasing support from the IMF/World Bank which argues 
that a large number of African countries have improved their absorptive capacity to use 
aid effectively and aid should therefore be provided at least for the 30 or so African 
countries in need of additional external resource.
214
 In the context of NEPAD, Figure 5 
shows a promising feature in ODA development in Africa. It shows that ODA to Africa 
has substantially increased since 2001 and that the prospects for growth in the near future 
are high.  
 
The main driver of the changing dynamics of Africa‟s ODA influx is getting the policy 
framework right at the local, regional and international levels. At a country level, African 
countries are moving towards liberal ideas of decentralization and privatization of public 
enterprises particularly in the infrastructural sector; priority is given to good governance 
and macroeconomic stability.
215
 Africa raised approximately $7.95 billion in terms of the 
number of new private enterprises and privatization activities accounted for by almost 
50% of the total gain in Southern Africa alone. The number of state owned enterprises 
also declined from 6069 to 4058 from 1990 to 1995.
216
  
 
In this regard, one can argue that the two way traffic of partnership with the developed 
countries and commitment to market-led policies by many African countries has led to a 
considerable improvement in capital flows in the region particularly after the adoption of 
the NEPAD initiate.  
 
5. The Market Access Initiative (MAI)  
 
The MAI is an integral aspect of the NEPAD programme. The integration of Africa into 
the global economy undergoes challenges related to supply constraints. But as market 
access become more and more important in the development discourse of Africa, 
NEPAD also envisages improving the export performance of African countries through 
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investment in infrastructure, policy framework such as the launch of the CAADP and the 
promotion of regional economic integration and PPP.   
 
The WTO defines market access as border measures like tariffs, tariff peaks, high tariffs, 
and tariff escalation, as well as non-tariff barriers.
217
 The goals of the NEPAD MAI are 
numerous and include improving African terms of trade, enhancing food security, 
improving productivity, and improving market standards.  
 
In broad terms, the NEPAD MAI “includes diversification of production, improving 
agro-productivity with emphasis on small scale and women farmers, enhance profitability 
of the mining, manufacturing, tourism and services sectors; promoting the private sector, 
promoting African exports and removing non-tariff barriers to international trade.”218  
 
Achieving several of these goals is a crucial challenge for both NEPAD and its 
development partners. The MAI requires actions to improve physical infrastructure, to 
provide a conducive and safe trade environment, building human capital capacity, good 
legislation, and state capacity for attracting investment.
219
 To assess success in the 
NEPAD MAI this section focuses on agriculture. The rationale behind the selection of 
this sector is that agriculture is a sensitive issue in international trade negotiations and 
that Africa has a comparable advantage in this sector.  
 
5.1 The importance of Agriculture for African economies 
 
With the exception of few countries (e.g. South Africa), Africa remains a net food 
importing region. However, exports of agricultural products represent an important 
source of foreign exchange earnings for several African countries. The share of 
agricultural products in total merchandise exports ranges from a high of more than 80 % 
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for Sudan and Burundi to a low of less than 1 % for Gabon and Equatorial Guinea.
220
 
Agriculture in Africa also accounts for employing 60% of the labour force, 20% of all 
merchandise exported, and 17% of GDP.
221
 
 
Paragraph 134 of the NEPAD document states that: “improvement in agricultural 
performance is a prerequisite of economic development on the continent. The resulting 
increase in rural people‟s purchasing power will also lead to higher effective demand for 
African industrial goods. The induced dynamics would constitute a significant source of 
economic growth”. Therefore, given the fact that agriculture is the dominant sector for a 
majority of African countries, the sector should therefore generate much of the resources 
needed for economic growth and for filling up the resource gap of the region.
222
 
 
Achieving this objective means addressing the different obstacles that prevent Africa 
from accessing the markets of major economies. For some, the main problem is based on 
the failure to conclude multilateral and bilateral trade negotiations such as the Doha 
Round of the WTO which was expected to lead to the development of Africa.
223
 Recall, 
the lack of inflexibility and political will from major players such as the EU, the U.S.A, 
India and Brazil were among the factors that led to the collapse of the Doha talks.  
 
The collapse of Doha translated to inherent reluctance from the part of the developed 
world to free their market economy. Africa suffers a long tradition of restricted access to 
markets in the developed world which weakens the ability of African states to export 
agriculture products. International trade in agriculture products is low for African 
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indigenous farmers.
224
 Also, subsidies from developed countries undermine any markets 
access initiative from the developing world including Africa. Overall, the total subsidies 
that Western nations pay their farmers reaches $US350 billion per year (about $US 
billion a day).
225
 In the U.S.A, the EU, France and Japan total subsidies constitute 31% of 
overall agricultural receipts.  
 
However, it should be remembered that many African countries already enjoy virtually 
duty-free access to markets in OECD countries through non-reciprocal preferential 
treatments. In addition to the Lome Trade Preferences for African Caribbean and Pacific 
group of States (ACP) (which continued until December 2007 under the auspices of the 
Cotonou Agreement), African countries benefit from a variety of Generalized System of 
Preferences (GSP) schemes such as the EU‟s EBA and the U.S‟s AGOA. These schemes 
imply that African countries must address non-tariff barriers (e.g. standards, sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures and rules of origins regulations) to access the market of their 
development partners.  
 
NEPAD‟s critics argue that the programme seems to be naïve in expecting billions of 
dollars from its market access initiative due to protectionist policies like the above 
mentioned in the industrialized countries and unfair international trading and financial 
system.
226
 However, non-tariff barriers are not the biggest challenge in achieving the 
MAI of NEPAD. In reality, GSP schemes have been under-utilized, mainly due to supply 
constraints in African countries. For instance, Africa lacks the capacity to produce and 
diversify its industrial goods, the means to comply with international standards necessary 
to benefit from bilateral trade agreements, and struggles for equitable integration into the 
multilateral trading regime.
227
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Other supply related challenges include “difficulties in importing essential materials at 
world prices to expand exports, enhancing the ability of domestic firms to meet price and 
quantity requirements of global supply chains, building legal and physical infrastructures 
conductive to international business development” as well as “limited access to finance 
by local firms, notably small-and medium sized enterprises (SMEs).”228 These are the key 
financial and technical assistance issues that NEPAD and its development partners must 
deal with to help African countries tackle their supply-side constraints and therefore 
achieve the MAI of NEPAD.
229
 In this regard, African countries failed to benefit from 
GSP schemes not only because of tariff or non-tariff barriers but also because of supply 
capacity with which to access the markets of their development partners.
230
 (figure 6).  
 
Figure 6: Barriers to export promotion and development  
 
Source: ECA Survey of African `Policymakers on the Monterrey Consensus and ERA (08).  
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Figure 6 shows that supply constraints constitute 32.4% of the overall barriers to export 
promotion and development in Africa. This is relatively an equal challenge for African 
food producers as market access which constitutes 37.8%. Therefore, addressing supply 
constraints in the agricultural sector is a crucial task for NEPAD. 
 
5.2 NEPAD’s vision in Agricultural Development in Africa 
 
NEPAD‟s position on agriculture is formulated in the context that agriculture in Africa 
suffers from low productivity resulting from persistent risks and vulnerability.
231
 Factors 
such as climate change and decrease in commodity prices have reduced agricultural 
fortunes over time. NEPAD recognizes the role of agriculture in rural development, food 
security and in creating a safety net mechanism for rural households. 
 
To complement high production in agriculture, NEPAD envisages expanding agricultural 
processing through its MAI to “encourage a strategy of diversification at the high end of 
the market, so that Africa does not become dependent only on its raw materials, but is 
also able to support growth through value added activities.”232 In this regard, NEPAD 
seeks to increase the capacity of rural farmers to participate in the export market through 
the production of high value added goods. It identifies incentives like access to water, 
land tenure and land reform, access to credit and financing schemes, investment in rural 
areas, and market access through trade liberalization, and greater private sector 
investment in manufacturing as necessary to stimulate agricultural growth. 
 
NEPAD identifies agriculture as a lead sector for growth and development and for 
ensuring long-term food security for Africa. Its key agricultural initiatives include “the 
2003 CAADP Framework calling for 6% agricultural growth rate; the 2003 Maputo 
Declaration calling for 10 % of public expenditure to be spent on agriculture and rural 
development within 5 years; the 2004 Sitre Declaration on „The Challenges of 
Implementing Integrated and Sustainable Development on Agriculture and Water in 
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Africa‟; and the 2006 Abuja Declarations on Fertilizers (June) and Food Security 
(December).”233  
 
NEPAD‟s agricultural plan includes issues related to land and water, management, food 
security and supply improvement, rural infrastructure and market access. Under market, 
access the plan aims to reverse Africa‟s declining share of the world exports which 
dropped from about 8% in the 1971-80 to 3.4% in the 1991-2000 period.
234
 Other goals 
of the MAI include investment in human resources; and help African countries to meet 
international standards for export products in line with the WTO SPS standards.
235
 
 
As far as the CAADP is concerned, NEPAD‟s vision is to address the problem of poverty 
and hunger in Africa. The CAADP is also a growth oriented agriculture framework 
“aimed at increasing agriculture growth rate to six % per year to create the wealth needed 
for rural communities and households in Africa to prosper.”236 It is perhaps the most 
important tool developed by NEPAD to address agricultural related projects including 
market access. It is a “strategic framework to guide country development efforts and 
partnerships to reach a higher path of economic growth through agriculture-led 
development.”237 As the main vehicle for driving NEPAD‟s vision for agriculture, the 
CAADP is the platform around which regional economic agencies, partners and national 
government will convene.
238
 It is both the main arm of NEPAD on matter related to 
agriculture and a way of structuring present and future regional and national 
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partnerships.
239
 The CAADP thus provides some policy directions to African countries 
concerning fixing up the agricultural sector.   
 
The CAADP has identified a number of programs which include: extending the area 
under sustainable land management and reliable water control systems; improving rural 
infrastructure and trade related capacities for market access; increasing food supply to 
reduce hunger, and improve responses to food emergency crises; and improving 
agriculture research, technology dissemination and adoption. To achieve these objectives, 
African leaders recognize that addressing issues related to governance, policy, and 
private sector investment are key elements “in improving the effectiveness of 
development assistance focused on hunger and poverty.”240 
 
Table 4: Percentage of national budget spent on agriculture, 2004-07 
 
Source: NEPAD Secretariat, Agriculture Unit, „National compliance with 2003 African Union Maputo 
Declaration to allocate at least 10% of national budget to agriculture development: 2007 draft survey 
report‟, October 2008 
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In assessing progress towards the CAADP, ActionAid reported that African countries 
have made limited progress towards meetings the CAADP commitments due to lack of 
sufficient political will among their governments. For instance, only seven out of Africa‟s 
53 countries have reached their commitments to spend 10 percent of their national budget 
on agriculture by 2008 (Table 4); only eleven countries have met CAADP‟s target of 6 % 
annual agricultural growth; and only one country (Rwanda) has harmonized its national 
policy with those of CAADP agricultural framework.
241
 This tendency is perpetuated by 
their bias towards urban elites and other key interest groups and therefore letting small-
scale farmers becoming more invisible to African decision-makers.
242
 
 
Figure 7: DAC ODA to agriculture, fisheries and forest as proportion of total DAC 
ODA, 1967-2006  
 
Source: OECD, 2008. and UNCTAD (EDA08) 
OECD (2008b) OECD Online Statistical Database [accessed 21 July 2008]. 
 
The report also found that donors have not done enough to meet their part of the CAADP 
commitments. Specifically, the CAADP envisaged half of the US$251 billion total 
investment envisaged to come from ODA or private investment, amounting to US$8.9 
billion a year. This commitment has not been met. While aid for African agriculture has 
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doubled from US$1.05 billion in 2002 to US$2.15 billion in 2007, “this is still four times 
less than what donors promised to deliver through CAADP.”243  
 
A reduction in donor support for agriculture has meant that Africa is left with limited 
resources available to address the agricultural sector. According to UNCTAD, “the 
overall donor support for agriculture has declined steadily from a peak of $8 billion in the 
early 1980s to $3.4 billion in 2004.”244 This includes a reduction of total ODA for 
agriculture from 16.9 % in 1982 to just 3.5 % in 2004; a reduction of ODA from DAC 
countries from 13 % to 3 % in the same period (see also Figure 7).
245
  
 
Nonetheless, NEPAD continues to become a bridge builder between Africa and its 
development partners particularly on issue related to agriculture. In the context of 
partnership in agricultural matters, NEPAD has established a consultation process 
between the G8 members and Africa through the G8 AAP on top of its CAADP plan. The 
G8 AAP contains the G-8 position and interpretation of NEPAD and is one of the few 
partnership agreements between NEPAD and its development partners evolving matters 
related to agriculture.
246
 
 
NEPAD also partners with the United Nations Industrial Development Organization 
(UNIDO)‟s Trade Capacity Building in its MAI capacity building needs. This approach 
has also been recognized by the UN General Assembly, and is reflected in major donor 
initiatives for trade/export development including the Norwegian Agency for 
Development Cooperation (NORAD) and the Swedish International Development 
Cooperation Agency (SIDA) strategy for export development in Africa). The approach 
also forms the foundation for cooperation between the UNIDO and the WTO for trade-
related technical assistance.
247
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NEPAD has further developed an implementation strategy to be implemented at national, 
regional and international levels which if put in place by African countries it could 
improve the export performance of agriculture in the region. The strategy is based on a 
three pronged strategy namely: capitalization on natural resources management, 
strengthening economic and trade reforms and, focus on rural development and 
poverty.
248
  
 
Table 5: NEPAD agricultural strategy implementation steps and actions 
 
Source: NEPAD (2001) 
 
The strategy further articulates issues which are necessary for the success of the NEPAD 
Agricultural Strategy. Among these issues are: getting agricultural and other economic 
policies right through policy reform and harmonization, access to and investment in land 
and water resources, facilitating investment, resource mobilization and capitalization on 
existing initiatives that have endorsed NEPAD (see also above 5 for more details).
249
  
 
In fact, NEPAD‟s partners acknowledge the limited capacity of Africa with regards to 
agriculture and are seeking to take action. The critical next steps are to increase funding 
for the agricultural sector and more donor alignment around the CAADP agenda.
250
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This aspect suggests a challenge to the hypothesis that NEPAD has been a beneficial 
initiative. However, what it reinforces is the complexity in assessing the outcome of this 
agreement and the efforts to overcome major obstacles to development. If anything, the 
attempt to address this aspect of North-South trade relations is a positive one in itself and 
the continued dialogue means that parties are actively trying to find solutions.  
 
5.3  Trends in Agriculture 
 
Figure 8: Whilst the annual growth rate of agriculture in Africa is increasing……… 
 
Source: World Bank (2007) and APF 
 
The above figure shows that overall; there has been a remarkable growth in the 
agricultural sector in Africa which doubled from 2.7% in 2002 to 5.3% in 2004, due to 
both high prices and outputs. Africa has also improved its position in world agricultural 
markets. Africa‟s share in commodity products has sharply increased from 0.8% to 5.4 % 
during the same period. But just like in the capital flow sector, despite this improvement, 
the region‟s share of global trade still remains lower comparing to other regions. As 
explained earlier, while market access is an important issue, supply-side constraints 
 72 
associated with factors such as weak infrastructure are equally important factors to blame 
for poor performance in regional share of agriculture for Africa.
251
 
 
Figure 9: Africa’s share in world trade (%) 
 
Source: Source: WTO (2008a).and UCTAD (ERA09)  
 
Over the last few years, Africa has registered some positive progress in terms of its trade 
performance (figure 9). The region accounted for over US$782 billion; accounting for 2.7 
% of world trade while 30 African countries exceeded the world average of 9.26 % in 
terms of the trade growth rate.
252
 Equatorial Guinea registered the highest average growth 
rate (36 %), followed by Chad (29 %), the Sudan and Angola (22 %), and Mozambique 
(18 %). In contrast, Eritrea and Zimbabwe registered negative growth rates (-0.85 %) and 
(-0.24 %), respectively.  
 
Furthermore, following further improvement in macroeconomic conditions and trade 
liberalization, agricultural growth in Africa slightly increased from a margin 2.3 % per 
annum in the 1980s to 3.8 % between 2001 and 2005.
253
 Africa‟s nominal value of its 
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agricultural export value also increased to US$25.3 billion in 2006 from about US$16.6 
billion to 14.7 billion between 1995 and 2000.
254
 But again, the region performed 
modestly in this sector when comparing to other regions (see Figure10). The factors that 
have caused this modest performance are twofold: (1) the concentration of agricultural 
export in a small number of countries (e.g. South Africa, Cote d‟Ivoire and Ghana); and 
(2) the increasing dependence on the export of traditional non-fuel primary commodity 
such as coffee, cotton, cocoa, tobacco, tea and sugar
255
 most of which suffering from a 
deteriorating trade volume and market value. Africa should therefore diversify the 
agriculture sector and improve export capacity in poor export performing economies.  
 
Figure 10: Agricultural export by value, sub-Saharan Africa and other developing 
regions  
 
Source: UNCTAD, 2008 
 
Also, despite success in trade growth rate (see figure 9) the region registered a negligible 
3 % of world total exports in 2007 (see figure 10). According to a WTO statistics, 
merchandize exports in Africa “increased by 15.6 % between 2006 and 2007 compared to 
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an average growth rate of 20 % in the previous four years.”256 Most of these exports went 
to major African partners such as North America and the EU with a cumulative share of 
exports of over 61 % in 2007.
257
 
 
Another key factor affecting the export of agricultural products in Africa is the failure to 
diversify the sector. In Africa, “exports remain highly undiversified with crude oil and 
minerals accounting for 70 % and agriculture and manufacturing about 30 % (table 6).”258 
In contrast, “Africa‟s share in world imports was about 2.5 % in 2007 and imports grew 
by 24 % in the same year. Imports were mainly concentrated in manufactured goods (68 
% of total merchandises imports), followed by fuels and mining products (15.4 %) and 
agricultural products (4 %)”.259 
 
Table 6: Africa’s total exports by product and trading area in 2007 ($US billions) 
 
Source: WTO (2008): International Trade Statistics. Geneva. And UNCTAD (ERA09) 
 
It is evident from the discussion above that there has been some slight improvement in 
the export sector of agricultural product of Africa. However, the region continues to 
remain by and large a very small player in this market due to the overwhelming 
concentration of Agricultural exports of Africa in the traditional bulk commodities form, 
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“which have also become concentrated in a small number of countries.”260 The big 
challenge ahead is to address the infrastructural gap of African economies.  
 
5.4 Action by NEPAD to improve market access in agriculture: bridging the 
infrastructural gap 
 
The founding document of NEPAD identifies infrastructure amongst its key sectoral 
priorities. NEPAD shares Africa‟s concerns over the importance of infrastructure to 
economic growth and development. In Southern Africa for instance, infrastructure 
bottlenecks constitute a major challenge to intra-regional trade and investment. “SADC 
member states are land-locked, making infrastructure an important consideration in the 
location decisions of firms.”261 Hence, South Africa which absorbs 60% of the total road 
network of the block tends to receive the largest share of FDI in the regional block.
262
 
This matter marked the highlights of NEPAD‟s meeting with its development partners 
such as the 2005 G8 Summit at the Gleneagles in terms of which the G8 undertook to 
support infrastructural issues such as “the rapid increase in electricity generation and 
interconnection.” 263 
 
The lack of infrastructural development in Africa constitutes a serious handicap to 
African production capacity and competitiveness in the global market. NEPAD has 
identified poor infrastructure as one of the main hindrances to economic growth and 
development for Africa. It is based on the promise that there can be no development 
without trade and there can be no trade without infrastructure which is defined in the 
context of transport, energy water, and information and communication technology 
(ICT). To support regional infrastructure, NEPAD‟s main roles are (1) to promote, 
facilitate and monitor the development of regional infrastructure activities; (2) to help 
putting in place the required structures, institutional capacity and funding to meet 
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Africa‟s Millennium Goals, and (3) to harmonize the activities of the RECs.264  
Therefore, bridging the infrastructural gap will not only help ameliorate the export deficit 
of Africa but will also strengthen the functioning of the RECs which NEPAD views as 
the “building blocks” for African economic integration. 
 
NEPAD adopts a unique approach to infrastructure development in Africa which 
complements ongoing national and regional projects with future ones. NEPAD 
strengthens existing regional and national infrastructure projects also known as Short-
Term Action Plan (STAP) with projects that require more time for preparation and 
development, also classified as Medium-and Long-Term Action Programme.
265
 Its 
infrastructural project includes increased investment both in maintenance and in new 
infrastructure, new regulatory framework, and the promotion of PPP. These two 
investment frameworks are also supported by the AfDB. The Bank also manages a multi-
million dollars NEPAD Infrastructure Project Preparation Facility (NEPAD-IPPF).
266
 
 
NEPAD‟s engagement with the rest of the world in terms of matters related to agriculture 
prompts the promotion of physical integration. However, inadequate infrastructure and 
services still constitutes a disincentive for investors, as well as an impediment to 
economic growth, and human and social development.
267
 At a regional level, NEPAD 
plays an important role in improving the infrastructural gap of the region. It harmonizes 
and coordinates the activities of the RECs through infrastructure development 
programme (e.g. STAP complemented by a Medium to Long Term- Strategic Framework 
(MLTSF) to foster growth through regional economic integration in Africa.
268
 
 
Launched in 2002, the STAP reflects NEPAD‟s response to the infrastructure challenges 
facing the continent. The main objectives of the STAP are “(1) to facilitate the 
establishment of the policy, regulation and institutional framework, create suitable 
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environment for investment and efficient operations; (2) capacity building initiatives to 
empower the implementing institutions (the RECs) to perform their mandates; (3) 
investment in physical and capital projects; and (3) studies to prepare future projects.”269 
NEPAD‟s role in this regard is to mobilize political will and actions to implement 
policies and institutional reforms; to facilitate the mobilizing of resources for regional 
projects; and to facilitate knowledge-sharing, networking and dissemination of best 
practices among countries, RECs and technical agencies.
270
  
 
The STAP laid down the foundation of the Canada‟s Fund for Africa‟s (CFA) support for 
the establishment of the NEPAD-IPPF which is also administered by the AfDB. The 
NEPAD-IPPF was subsequently approved by the AfDB in November 2003 and became 
effective in 2004 and as requested by the government of Canada in line with NEPAD 
HSGIC, the IPPF was converted by the Bank into a multi-donor fund in 2005.
271
  
 
The purpose of the NEPAD-IPPF is to assist African countries, RECs and related infrastructure 
development institutions to prepare high quality, viable/regional continental infrastructure projects that 
would be ready to solicit financing from public and private sources in support of the objectives of NEPAD. 
The Fund is also designated to support the creation of an enabling environment for private participation in 
infrastructure, as well as to support targeted capacity building initiatives to enhance the sustainability of 
existing and planned infrastructure developed in the continent, in fulfilment of the NEPAD objectives.
272
 
 
Co-operation has improved both at the national level and cross-border level. Many 
African countries have prepared strategic mechanisms for road transport, “but progress in 
water resources management has been much weaker, and the energy has yet to receive a 
similar focus.” “Significant progress has been made in promoting regional arrangements 
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and institutions, and a framework for co-ordination between the AU, NEPAD, RECs and 
the AfDB has been agreed.”273  
 
In sum, NEPAD has achieved to make a positive impact on the infrastructural gap that 
exists in Africa. Infrastructural projects and activities have improved in Africa after 
NEPA. They have created the ground work for sustainable economic growth and 
development. This challenges the rhetoric of dependency theory scholars that NEPAD 
will not benefit the region.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Finally, it can be said that NEPAD‟s attempt to mobilize resources for development in 
Africa is work in progress.  Indeed, there has been a significant improvement in terms of 
the level of FDI and ODA flows into Africa since the creation of NEPAD. However, 
Africa‟s share of net capital flows still remains lower comparing to other regions. This 
poses a bit of challenge to the hypothesis of the study.  
 
The role played by NEPAD in improving the investment climate in Africa includes the 
creation of PPP such as the African Investment Initiative, and the promotion of 
partnerships with its development partners to change the perception of Africa as a high 
risk zone in FDI and to ensure commitments with ODA pledges.  
 
The chapter has also found that adherence to market-led policies by many African 
countries has been a key contributing factor to the improvement of the NEPAD‟s vision 
of resource mobilization.  Nevertheless, there has been a mix results in terms of the CFI. 
African countries have done relatively well in terms of improving FDI level since 
NEPAD was formed as opposed to ODA. This is due to the fact that much of the 
resources allocated by Western donors to African development in the form of ODA have 
gone to debt cancellation instead of more tangible targets such as budget support.  
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Increasing ODA for debt relief appears not to be pro-poor. NEPAD needs to strike a 
balance between ODA for debt relief and other goals like budget support. Otherwise, 
ODA to Africa will increase dependency with the developed world instead of partnership 
for development. The results will put NEPAD‟s aims into jeopardy.  
 
In terms of the MAI, supply constraints (e.g. poor infrastructure) which are domestic 
issues (not tariff related) continue to weaken Africa‟s ability to trade with its 
development partners. Thus, African countries are yet to benefit from greater access to 
the agricultural market of the developed world as a result of NEPAD. This poses a severe 
challenge to the hypothesis of the study.  
 
However, NEPAD is doing a considerable progress to address this issue. NEPAD has 
established a special programme (the CAADP) to fight hunger and poverty and to 
promote the processing of agricultural products in Africa. But considering that most 
governments have fallen short of the CAADP target, a longer timeline for meeting it 
should be implemented. Special programmes (e.g. such as the STAP and the MLTSF) 
and fund (e.g. NEPAD-IPPF) have also been established by NEPAD to address the 
infrastructural gap of Arica which weaken the MAI of NEPAD further.  
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Chapter 4: Assessing the concepts of “mutual accountability” and “mutual 
responsibility”: a case study on Ghana  
 
1. Introduction   
The previous chapter has assessed whether NEPAD as a partnership programme has been 
successful in mobilizing financial resources from its developed partners to Africa. This 
chapter aims to analyse the concept of “mutual accountability” and “mutual 
responsibility” within the framework of NEPAD. In terms of these concepts, the general 
assumption is that NEPAD‟s developed partners shall reward more resources for 
development to those countries that demonstrate strong commitments to good governance 
through peer review. Therefore, the chapter wants to find out if that “mutual 
accountability” and “mutual responsibility” between NEPAD‟s developing member states 
and its developed partners has occurred over the last eight years. To measure success in 
this respect, the chapter will analyse the inter-linkage between good governance and 
external aid provision taking into account Ghana as a case study.     
 
Ghana was the first African country to undergo peer review which is a stepping-stone 
towards good governance practices. This was the rationale behind the selection of Ghana 
as case study. So, by going through Ghana‟s peer review process, the point of arrival is to 
test the country‟s commitment to good governance against commitment on the part of 
NEPAD‟s development partners to increased aid for development for the country.  
 
As already explained in Chapter 2, good governance is a complex concept which involves 
a number of ingredients. In this chapter the focus will be on the relationship between 
Ghana‟s commitments to two important criteria of good governance - (1) democracy and 
political good governance (e.g. the functioning of the legislature, judicial, and executive 
branches, as well as the non-governmental sector), and (2) economic governance and 
management (e.g. macroeconomic management, public financial management and 
accountability) -  and ODA flows.   
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2. Ghana and the APRM   
John Kufuor believes that he is a democrat, and APRM was a way to demonstrate his personal commitment 
to promoting good governance in the country. He had already embarked on a policy of transparency and 
accountability in his administration, and APR [African Peer Review] was a mechanism to further his 
approach…No doubt part of Kufuor‟s thinking in being first was to attract investment and aid. If Ghana 
was perceived to be open and transparent, it would be seen as a good place to do business. The G8 will use 
how a country does in peer review to influence its decisions, whether formally or informally.
274
 
 
Ghana has a record of a pioneer in African politics. In 1957, it was the first sub-Saharan 
African country to gain independence. Ghana was also the first country to undergo peer 
review in 2005 before Kenya, Rwanda, Mauritius, and South Africa. What prompted 
Ghana to champion the peer review was to demonstrate its commitment to democracy 
and good governance in order to become more attractive for aid donors and investors. 
According to the Ghanaian President John Kufuor “participating in the APRM would 
potentially win Ghana prestige and benefits from international donors, who had shown 
great enthusiasm for NEPAD and APRM from its inception. Ghana remains a heavily 
aid-dependent state, with about 40 % of its budget being donor-funded.”275   
 
Ghana has been very enthusiastic with the APR since its inception. The country signed 
the Memorandum of Understating for the APRM review on 9 March 2003 at the Sixth 
Summit of the HSGIC of NEPAD held in Abuja, Nigeria. Subsequently, the country 
created a new Ministry of Regional Cooperation and NEPAD in May 2003 and assigned 
the head of the Ministry as the APRM Focal Point in the review process.
276
 Furthermore, 
“a national APRM Governing Council of seven highly qualified and eminent 
personalities was also set up. And by so doing, Ghana took the appropriate steps to 
ensure that it would be in a position to conduct an independent self-assessment of its 
governance record.”277 In other words, the objective of the Council was to meet the 
requirement for participating countries to have an independent self-assessment of its 
governance record in the four focus areas covered by the APRM.  
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These focus areas are: Democracy and Political Governance (DPG); Economic 
Governance and Management (EGM); Corporate Governance (CG) and Socio-Economic 
Development (SED). Under DPG, the APRM seeks to create democracies that ensure 
respect for all basic rights of citizens, while under EGM, the aim is to ensure that 
countries formulate credible, realistic and achievable policies designed to reduce poverty 
and promote growth and sustainable development. In terms of SED, the APRM “aims at 
ensuring that Africans have what it takes to lead a dignified life such as adequate access 
to education, health, housing, good drinking water and good sanitation and fair 
distribution of nation‟s wealth”, whereas in respect of CG, the mechanism “aims at 
engendering success in the private sector and ensuring that corporations do not pollute 
without regard to the value of life.”278 
 
Each of the these focus area contains different objectives but in this study the focus is on 
two: (1) the enhancement constitutional democracy, including periodical political 
competition and opportunity for choice, the rule of law, citizen‟s rights, as entrenched in 
all African and international human rights instruments under the GPD, and (2) the pursuit      
of transparency, effectiveness and predictability of government economic policies under 
the EGM. Like other countries that have been peer reviewed, the APRM process in 
Ghana was based on two consecutive reports: a country self-assessment report (CSAR) 
based on a questionnaire covering the four focus areas of the APRM and a Country 
Review Mission (CRM) conducted by the APR Panel.  
 
The common consensus between the CSAR and the CRM on the Ghana review is that the 
country is well on track in pursuing the main objectives of the APRM. Ghana proved to 
be in compliance with many aspects of good governance agenda according to its peer 
review report. It has particularly proved efficient in monitoring democracy and sound 
economic management (box 2). However, the APR Panel discovered a number of 
challenges that need further actions in order for the country to meet the ultimate 
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objectives of NEPAD and the APRM. And the salient overarching gaps include: “(a) 
capacity constraints; (b) gender equity; (c) corruption; (d) decentralization; (e) land issues 
(f) chieftaincy, (g) unemployment and (f) external dependency.”279 
 
Box 2: Ghana-awining combination of smooth democartic transition and sound 
economic management 
 
  Source: Ghana, Ministry of Finance
280
 and ERA (02) 
 
In many African countries, the issues of chieftaincy and land remain sources of conflict 
and political instability. Chieftaincy in Ghana is particularly responsible for several types 
of communal conflicts related to ethnicity, succession to traditional political office and 
the struggle over land which is in the hand of traditional leaders.
281
 So, the fact that the 
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land tenureship system in Ghana, particularly in the Northern part of the country, is 
controlled by tribal leaders could potentially renew ethnic conflicts in the country.  
 
However, these are minor problems in Ghana. The country is relatively stable. It has a 
healthy political environment and a well functioning government. Nonetheless, the APR 
Panel made the following remarks: “Ghana should continue efforts to review and 
modernize the institution of chieftaincy to be more responsive to the population‟s needs, 
including those of women, and enhance the capacities of the National, Regional and 
Traditional Houses of Chiefs to clear case backlogs within a set time-frame.”282 The 
Panel also recommended Ghana “to introduce a comprehensive land law and a firm plan 
to accede to and ratify several international protocols, especially those dealing with 
human rights.”283  
 
3. Assessing DPG in Ghana: enhance constitutional democracy, including 
periodical political competition and opportunity for choice, the rule of law, 
citizen’s rights, as entrenched in all African and international human rights 
instruments under the GPD   
 
...the NEPAD Framework Document and Declaration identify, among others, democracy and good political 
governance as preconditions and foundations of sustainable development and the eradication of poverty. 
The Overall objective is to consolidate a constitutional political order in which democracy, respect for 
human rights, the rule of law, separation of powers and effective, responsive public services are realized to 
ensure sustainable development and a peaceful and stable society. 
NEPAD/HSGIC-03-2003/APRM/OSCI, 9 March 2003 
 
Since its return to constitutional rule in 1992, Ghana has joined the likes of a few 
countries in Africa where significant progress has been made in terms of maintaining the 
momentum of the democratic transition, political stability with relatively little ethnic 
conflict.
284
 While many African countries have not been able to maintain democracy after 
participating in the „democratic wave‟ of the early 1990s, Ghana has qualitatively 
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improved its democratic processes including electoral process, human rights protection, 
and civil-military relations.
285
  
 
This section reviews the DPG area of the APRM process of Ghana. It should be 
remembered that at one point before NEPAD was established, Ghana suffered from 
political instability. However, According to the APR Panel,  
 
despite the turbulence of four coups d’état between 1957 and 1981, the country has experienced neither 
civil conflict nor interstate war. The country review report emphasizes that Ghana is seen as an oasis in an 
otherwise volatile sub-region and observes that regional tensions with Benin, Burkina Faso and Togo  have 
largely dissipated under President John Kufuor‟s „good neighborliness‟ policy.
286
  
 
Throughout its review process, Ghana has shown the African continent that in many 
respects it complies with good governance. The country has for instance met the 
objective of enhancing constitutional democracy, including periodical political 
competition and opportunity for choice, the rule of law, citizen‟s rights, and supremacy of 
the Constitution which is an important complement of the DPG focus area of the APRM 
process. The country has also demonstrated to Africa and the rest of the world that in 
Africa, democratic contest for political power is possible and that the judicial instruments 
can be independent. First, Ghana enjoys a presidential-parliamentary system of 
governance under a multi-party electoral system and has a Constitution dating from 1992 
which guarantees and protects a broad range of rights and freedoms for its citizens.
287
  
Second, the country showed strong respect for the rule of law and the supremacy of the 
Constitution - “the basic foundations on which all the institutions of governance, the 
private sector and civil society are grounded.”288 
 
Furthermore, Ghana has established the necessary legislative and administrative 
instruments to create the proper environment for the implementation of good governance 
standards. Ghana has got independent bodies such as the Electoral Commission (EC) and 
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the National Commission for Civic Education of 1992 which promote and protect 
political rights including securing the independence of electoral mechanisms to ensure 
free and fair elections. Established in 1993, the Commission for Human Rights and 
Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) ensures electoral competition, good governance and 
accountability. The CHRAJ instrument is mandated to: “(a) investigate and take remedial 
action, or make appropriate recommendation on complaints of alleged corruption, abuse 
of public power and human rights violations; (b) to promote public knowledge and 
awareness of human rights; and (c) to enforce the provision of Chapter 24 of the 
Constitution on the Code of Conduct for public officials.”289   
 
These factors have not only contributed to high ODA in Ghana but have also changed the 
economic context of the country. According to Abdulai, “over the last fifteen years, 
official government statistics suggest that Ghana has managed to reduce poverty levels 
significantly by an annual average rate of 1.5% from high of 51.7% of the population in 
1991/91 to 39.5% in 1998/99 and then further to 28.55% in 2005/2006. During the same 
period, the proportion of Ghanaians described as extremely poor was also reported to 
have declined from 36.55% to 26.8% and then to 18.2%.”290   
 
Overall, Ghana‟s CRM found that competition for political power is robust and open in 
the country and that succession from one party and president to another has been done in 
orderly fashion through the peaceful and internationally accepted free and fair elections 
held since 1992.
291
 Box 3 provides a summary of Ghana‟s APRM report on issues related 
to DPG. 
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Box 3: Dividends of democracy in Ghana 
 
 
NEPAD, 2005 
 
Despite the findings of the APRM report in terms of achievement in democracy and 
respect for the rule of law, the report highlighted a number of issues that need actions to 
strengthen democracy and good governance processes in the country. These include, 
concerns about the poor financing of the Electoral Commission and other key institutions, 
notably are human rights, financial and logistic capacities, the lack of internal democracy 
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within political parties, the under-representation of women all of which could potentially 
harm the democratization process of the country in the long run.
292
 
 
Nonetheless, without disregarding the APR Panel‟s recommendations, President Barack 
Obama‟s first official visit to Ghana as the President of the U.S substantiates that the 
country is indeed committed to democracy and good governance. The purpose of 
President Obama‟s visit was to pay tribute to the effective governance that Ghana has put 
in place. Accordingly, “we have seen progress in democracy and transparency and the 
rule of law, as in the case protection of property rights, and anti-corruption efforts.”293  
 
During his visits, President Obama stressed the role played by Ghana in strengthening 
democracy and good governance. Ghana has made an extraordinary progress around 
democratic issues. The country has established “a set of institutions that are sustaining 
democracy and openness and participation...an economy that has been well managed...a 
greater level of transparency and openness...growth strategies that are actually delivering 
improved standards of living for the people.”294 All of these reasons prompted Obama‟s 
visit to Ghana:  “the people of Ghana have worked hard to put democracy on a firmer 
footing, with repeated peaceful transfer of power even in the wake of closely contested 
elections…and with improved governance and emerging civil society, Ghana‟s economy 
has shown impressive rates of growth.”295 
 
4. Assessing EGM in Ghana: pursue transparency, effectiveness and 
predictability of government economic policies       
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... to promote market efficiency, to control wasteful spending, to consolidate democracy, and to encourage 
private financial flows all of which are officials aspects of the quest to reduce poverty and enhance 
sustainable development.  
Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and corporate Governance, paragraph 18 
 
After a long period of military rule and bad governance, Ghana rebounded following the 
launch of a tough economic recovery programme two decades ago followed by a 
successful democratization process.
296
 In addition to the DPG, Ghana has also made 
significant commitment to the EGM aspect of good governance of the APRM. The 
country has taken major steps in implementing best practices in a number of institutional, 
structural, and aspects of macroeconomic management, among others, in order to 
improve fiscal transparency, budgetary processes and corporate governance.
297
  
 
In so doing, the country has adopted various internationally recognized standards and 
codes, plans; it has passed laws, adopted new norms, and reformed various practices in 
this regard.
298
 Among them are: The NEPAD Framework Document (2001) ratified in 
2003; the Constitutive Act of the African Union (2000) ratified in 2001; the Core 
Principles for Systematically Important Payment Systems ratified and translated into law 
in 2003; the Core Principles for Security and Insurance Supervision and Regulations 
adopted in 1997; the African Union Conventions on Prevention and Combating 
Corruption signed in 2003; and the Abuja Treaty establishing the African Economic 
Community (1991) adopted in 1991.
299
  
 
Notwithstanding Ghana‟s efforts, African countries in general are quick to sign treaties 
and conventions but reluctant to enact and implement them. The Ghanaian APRM 
country report for instance has only made one reference of a ratified Act in EGM which 
is the Core Principles for Systematically Important Payment Systems also passed into 
law. This is a crucial challenge regarding the success of NEPAD. But, at least in Ghana, 
the government has delegated relevant institutions to ensure the implementation of the 
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above codes and standards. The respective institutions are Parliament, Ministry of 
Regional Cooperation and NEPAD; Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Bank of Ghana and; 
Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Justice and Attorney general.
300
 The appointment of 
these wash dog bodies suggests a positive movement towards good governance.  
 
Under the EGM, the pursuit of transparency, effective and predictable government 
economic policies are important objective in this focus area. In terms of the APRM 
mechanism, “transparency refers to an environment in which the public is supplied with 
the following in a clear, accessible and timely manner: (a) the objectives of policy and its 
institutional (including legal) and economic framework; (b) policy decisions and their 
rationale; (c) data on information related to policies; and (d) the terms of 
accountability.”301 
 
The findings of the APR instruments (the CSAR and the CRM) with respect to the EGM 
area in Ghana are appealing. Accordingly, “actions that would make public 
administration, legal and legislative systems, and the fiscal authorities work effectively in 
a transparent manner.”302 Ghana has stepped forward a number of projects in the 1990s to 
achieve this objective. Key initiatives include the National Institutional Renewal 
Programme (1994), Civil Service Performance Improvement Programme (1996), Public 
Sector Management Reform Programme (1999), Public Financial Management Reform 
Programme (1999) and the National Governance Project (1997). Although these projects 
produced mixed results, inadequate political commitment and time-frames for 
implementation were the main reason behind failure to achieving appropriate 
transparency and effectiveness.
303
 
 
The donor community also regards Ghana as one of the most stable economies in Africa 
and one of the most promising democratic experiments in the region due to positive 
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prospects for socio-economic improvement.
304
 Ghana is a model of success story in the 
African continent. According to Guseh, the international community praises Ghana for its 
successful political and economic reforms while development agencies and scholars 
perceive the country to be in the forefront of African socioeconomic issues.
305
  Ghana 
maintains a stable economy with a GDP growth which grew from 4.2% in 2001 to 5.8% 
in 2004
306
 and 6.2% in 2006.
307
 
 
Box 4:  Better economic management in 2001- the new government’s first year  
 
Source: Economic Commission for Africa, from official sources and the ERA (03) 
 
Ghana provides a case for a successful democratic economy and sound economic 
management (box 4). Ghana has earned credit as a haven of good governance in West 
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Africa.
308
 In return, the nation has every reason to expect its development partners to 
reward it with more resources (e.g. aid) for development. Yet, conversely, if the reality 
does not live up to the rhetoric in Ghana, then the relationship between good governance 
and increased aid assistance will remain discouraging. Nor, will the concepts of “mutual 
accountability” and “mutual responsibility” between Africa and its development partners 
hold true. 
 
5. Ghana: an aid dependent economy   
Commitment to good governance practices offers Ghana high level of prospects for aid 
assistance from the developed world. Besides championing the APRM, Ghana was 
prematurely confident with the effects of the APRM process. The Ghanaian President has 
repeatedly spoken about his convictions of using the APRM as a tool not only to infuse 
good governance and alleviate poverty but also to attract more donors and investors. 
 
In reality, aid support from donor community to Ghana is not an option but a necessity. 
Ghana depends heavily on Western donors countries. The country “represents the Word 
Bank‟s largest programme in sub-Saharan Africa, amounting to a high case scenario of 
$1.4 billion over four years.”309  
 
Furthermore, the government of Ghana desperately needs aid assistance from its external 
partners to outsource its annual budget. Particularly, since its 1983 tough economic 
reforms, the country has received significant ODA flows to fix up its budget deficit. As a 
customary source of external revenue in the country, aid accounts over 50% of Ghana‟s 
development budget and about 12% of gross national income (GNI).
310
 In the year 2001 
alone, donor assistance to economic services and infrastructure budgets represented 86 % 
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for the agriculture sector, 90 % for energy, 72 % for industry, 76 % for water, and 76 % 
for roads.”311 
 
To add on that, Ghana has received over US$50 ODA per capita per year in recent 
years.
312
 Further, although OAD as a source of foreign currency to finance imports has 
dropped in relative terms over the years, ODA amounted to 14% of imports of goods and 
services in 2006.”313 Also, “in 2007, about a third of OAD went to the government 
budget (US$378 million), amounting to 20% of government consumption 
expenditures.”314 
 
Aid is also a major source of finance to key development projects in Ghana that work 
towards meeting the MDGs and the country‟s poverty alleviation strategy (GPRS I and 
II). In addition to this, budget support from development partners in the form of grant and 
confessional loans averaged $300 million per year between 2003 and 2009 including 
$380 million plea for the 2009 budget alone. In the same year, aid flows to Ghana 
reached approximately $2 billion, the highest since the beginning of the millennium.
315
  
 
Nonetheless, the recent global economic and financial crisis presents a challenge to 
continued Ghanaian development. It will be difficult to expect development partners 
seriously affected by the downturn to increase aid flow and to finance the resource gap 
and the budget deficit of African economies including aid dependent Ghana (figure 11). 
Empirical works reveal the following: “total aid disbursements are positively correlated 
with donor‟s output…..hence, given the severity of the slowdown in growth in developed 
economies, a potential reduction in bilateral aid flows to Ghana is not unlikely.”316  
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Figure 11: Aid flows, 2003-2011 (US$ million)  
 
Source: Authors‟ calculations based on data obtained from the World Bank.  
 
In this context, one would assume that aid to Ghana will be reduced. However, this 
appears not to be the case. For example, “on 1 Augusts 2006, Ghana signed a compact 
with the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) (a corporation of the United States‟ 
government which aims to promote development in the world‟s poorest countries). In 
terms of this, about $US547 million would be made available over five years. It would 
aim at reducing poverty by raising farmers‟ incomes through increasing production and 
productivity and enhancing the country‟s export base.”317 Indeed, the MCC 
acknowledged that the deal is a testament to Ghana‟s strong commitment to good 
governance and building the necessary instructional makeup for aid effectiveness,
318
 said 
the Chief Executive Officer of the MCC, Ambassador John Danilovich in a press release. 
Therefore, the hypothesis that Ghana and its developed partners are mutually accountable 
and responsible proves to hold true.  
 
International donors have ranked Ghana among the success stories of economic 
development in Africa. The country has emerged as one with strong economic and 
political ties with developed countries or donor community. Therefore, the country‟s 
development patterns are linked with the international community and Western donors in 
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particular.
319
 In many respect, “Ghana‟s development since independence in 1957 has 
been defined as much by its engagement with the international community as by its often 
tempestuous domestic politics and policies.”320   
 
Ghana‟s emergence is a development miracle following its return to constitutional rule in 
1992. “For example, from 1992-1999 it succeeded in reducing poverty from 51.7% to 
39.55%. During the same period, the incidence of extreme poverty was reduced from 
36.4% to 26.8%.”321 According to Hughes, “Ghana‟s recent macroeconomic performance 
has been encouraging. Whilst the GDP growth rate of 5.2% is the best in a decade, 12-
month consumer price inflation has dropped from 23% at the end of 2001 to 11.2% in 
April 2004.”322 
 
More to the point, Ghana‟s commitment to pro-development macroeconomic policies 
reinforces its relationship with its development partners further. As noted by the ECA, 
“of the eight African countries with the best prospects of achieving some of the MDGs by 
2015, Ghana ranks third in sub-Saharan  Africa in macro-economic stability, institutional 
development and poverty reduction.”323 The World Bank believes that Ghana is among a 
handful of African economies that may meet some of the MDGs.
324
 Therefore; it proves 
to be true that Ghana‟s commitments to internationally recognized development blue 
prints like the MDGs have led the donor community to deliver on aid promise. As a 
result, the country has its debt burden written off by donors.  
 
6. Debt relief and debt cancellation in Ghana  
 
ODA flows to Ghana play an important role in uplifting the debt burden of the country. It 
mainly constitutes a larger share of the country‟s externally funded budget. Ghana has for 
instance attracted a large pull of resources from its external partners since its 1983 reform 
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to finance the twin domestic and external deficit despite some levelling-off in the more 
recent time.
325
 This includes the decrease in ODA/GNI ratio from a peak of 15.5 % in 
2004 to just 10.5 % in 2005.
326
 
 
It becomes apparent that the APRM holds positive prospects for Ghana. The programme 
“has been cited in Ghana‟s Debt Cancellation of US$4.5 billion dollars and the 
Millennium Challenge Account of US$ 290 million dollars.”327 Also, in 2002, Ghana met 
the requirement for debt forgiveness (under the HIPC initiative) from the Bretton Woods 
institutions and other creditor nations, particularly those belonging to the Paris Club. In 
terms of the HIPC formula, the reduction of Ghana‟s debt to 250% of government budget 
translated into a debt forgiveness of $2,186 million (net present value), representing 
56.2% of its debt and leading the country to save some $200 million in debt interest 
servicing over a 10-year period.
328
  
 
Figure 12: Ghana’s external debt 
 
Fosu, A. K (2009)  
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Moreover, in 2004, Ghana reached a point whereby its amount of aid assistance, together 
with any other amount agreed to with leaders, was released due to the country‟s 
compliance with  pre-determined „triggers‟,329 such as good governance. Figure 12 shows 
that “Ghana‟s external debt stock has been decreasing since 2000 from a high of 126.6 % 
of GDP to only 10.5 % in 2005.”330 This proves that Ghana has been the beneficiary of 
substantial debt relief and scaling-up of OAD. And, the cancellation of the country‟s debt 
problem paralleled with an increase in OAD from about US$824 million in 2003 to about 
$1797 million in 2008, constituting about 10% of GNI (figure 13).
331
  
 
Figure 13: Trends in aid flows, 1960-2006  
       
Source: Whitefield and Jones (2009) & ODI, 2009 
 
Despite that, these findings do not challenge the hypothesis of this study. On the contrary, 
they strongly support the positive relationship between good governance and increased 
aid assistance thus accepting the existence of „mutual accountability‟ and „mutual 
responsibility‟ between Africa and its development partners.  Ghana is widely considered 
to be an African success story, in a way an uncommon or abnormal circumstance.   
 
However, Ghana is not the only country of NEPAD where one can measure the success 
of this programme. NEPAD‟s success is also evident in countries like Rwanda, which is 
                                                 
329
 Ibid. 85 
330
 Fosu, A. K Op. Cit. 12 
331
 Ackah, C. G, Aryeetey, E. and Aryeetey, E Op. Cit. 15 
 98 
one of Africa‟s leading examples in respect of good governance. On the contrary, 
Zimbabwe represents a failed case for NEPAD mainly due to its reluctance to comply 
with democratic good governance. The following section will give a brief examination of 
these two countries to reinforce the hypothesis of the present dissertation. 
 
7. Rwanda: APRM     
 
After its independence from Belgium in 1962, Rwanda was marked by a history of civil 
war (1990) and ethnic conflict (e.g. genocide in 1995) which challenged its very 
existence. In recent years however, the country has conformed to the components of good 
governance including respects for democracy and the rule of law. Rwanda has undergone 
dramatic institutional reforms and political reconstruction and has put in place a 
functioning and stable government with all its branches (executive, judiciary, and 
legislature).
332
  
 
In the aftermath of its 1994 genocide, the government of Rwanda has established policies 
and institutions that promote participatory democratic governance. It has particularly 
been able to spread out administrative and financial powers to local governments closer 
to the communities of Rwanda which have led to the formulation and successive adoption 
of the 2000 decentralization policy.
333
 Founded on the principles of participation, and 
ownership of development programs for local governments, the policy “has been 
enshrined in the laws and is at the heart of the nationwide democratization process as 
well as the poverty reduction strategy.”334 Since then the country has dramatically 
redefined its political landscape. 
 
The government of Rwanda has adopted a policy of zero tolerance for corruption and 
routinely investigates and takes legal actions against allegations involving public 
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officials. The country ranks far better than its neighbours in Transparency International‟s 
Corruption Perception Index as well as on the Ibrahim Index of African governance.
335
 
Dramatic institutional reforms took place in Rwanda to foster sound financial 
management. The government has created an Organ Budget Law – a new procurement 
code and oversight institution, and a Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability 
assessment mechanism. Overall, the Rwandan government has created a number of 
institutions aimed at fostering and monitoring good governance. These include the 
national Unity and Reconciliation Commission, Human Rights Commission, National 
Electoral Commission, the Auditor General, National Tender Board and Ombudsman.
336
 
 
Furthermore, Rwanda joins the like of a small number of African countries that allow for 
multiparty elections to regularly take place and maintains a smooth continuity of 
government after a long period of ethnic cleansing. According to Jordaan, “the Rwanda 
of today is by and large safe, politically stable, quite responsibly governed relative to 
many other African states, and more unified than it has been for decades.”337  
 
Above all, Rwanda is also amongst the first sixteen African nations to accede to the 
APRM in March 2003 which is an indication of progress towards compliance with good 
governance. It was the third country to undergo peer review in 2005 after Ghana and 
Kenya. Throughout its review process, Rwanda presented acceptable practices of good 
governance from which other countries in Africa can emulate.  
 
On DPG, the report found that, in the wake of its 1994 genocide event, Rwanda has been 
making “significant progress in political reconciliation with the establishment of a new 
constitution in 2003 that guarantees basic human rights, separation of powers, and the 
establishment of the national institutions necessary to reconcile the nation and to deal 
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with genocide crimes.”338 Since then, democracy and political governance has replaced 
ethnic conflict and political instability in the country. However, the country still needs to 
overcome a number of obstacles related to democracy. These include limited “political 
space for competition of ideas and power”, improvement in the voting system of local 
communities and improvement in the capacity of the Electoral Commission.
339
 
 
Moreover, the country made important progress in economic governance and 
management including best practices for budget transparency.
340
 The country has been 
able to deal with a number of critical issues that defined its post-genocide economy. 
These include, “internal and external security, reconstruction, rehabilitation of displaced 
persons, and redressing of social fragmentation.”341 It has been found from its peer 
review report that Rwanda had incredibly reshuffled its economy from a condition of 
near collapse and that it has achieved remarkable reforms in many aspects of its 
economy.
342
 Furthermore, the role of the Rwandese government in the economy has been 
made clear through the privatization process of the country and improvement in the 
regulatory framework.
343
  
 
Besides the APRM, good governance is a matter of national policy in Rwanda. The 
government of Rwanda acknowledges the link between good governance and poverty 
alleviation. In 2001, the Rwandese government held a National Conference for Integrated 
Evaluation and Planning to Strengthening Good Governance Poverty Reduction in 
Rwanda in order to encourage good governance and poverty alleviation.
344
 The workshop 
led the government to develop a national policy document called: “National Strategy 
Framework Paper on Strengthening Good Governance for Poverty Reduction in 
Rwanda.”345 As a result of these developments, positive performance in aid and 
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investment has occurred in the country. In fact, what caused the economic success story 
of Ghana can be repeated elsewhere in Africa. Rwanda is another NEPAD‟s developing 
member state that has been successful in attracting more ODA after commitment to good 
governance.  
 
 7.1 Trends in ODA to Rwanda  
                                       
                                            Figure 14: ODA per Capita 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
 
                                    Source: OECD, Africa Strategic Outlook, 2004-205 
 
Rwanda‟s commitment to good governance has made the country an enviable destination 
for ODA. First of all, “Rwanda‟s Aid Policy identifies budget support as the preferred 
modality of aid delivery.”346 Budget support means “the transfer of financial resources of 
an external financing agency to the national treasury of a partner country.”347 This aspect 
has been met by the donor community in Rwanda. In 2005, ODA to Rwanda which was 
approximately US$ 500 million represented 23 % of the GDP, more than half of 
government budget and more than 90 % of its capital investment budget.
348
 “This 
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amounted to $55 per capita, compared with an average in sub-Saharan Africa of 
approximately $25 per capita” (see bellow 14).349 This challenges the opinion of 
dependency theorists who say that NEPAD has not been successful.    
 
Furthermore, since the 1994 genocide the aim of ODA to Rwanda has been to support 
long-term development. ODA to Rwanda plays an important role in the socio-economic 
development of the country. In 2004, Rwanda was the recipient of US$468 million in 
ODA which accounted for 26% of GNI, and nearly half of the government budget.
350
  
Rwanda has also experienced a steady increase in ODA since 2002. Total ODA to the 
country reached US$ 695 million in 2007, about US$ 65 per capita accounting about 50% 
of the 2005-2007 budgets.
351
 In Zimbabwe however, the picture looks different.  
 
8. Zimbabwe 
 
Zimbabwe presents a case where NEPAD has not been successful. The state of 
Zimbabwe has been fragile and ungovernable since the year 2000 to early 2009
352
 as a 
result of severe restrictions of political and civil rights and increased isolation from the 
international community. A fragile state is one significantly susceptible to crisis in one or 
more of its institutional structures where “state power is unable and or unwilling to 
deliver core functions to the majority of its people: security, protection of property rights, 
basic public services and essential infrastructure.”353 Its characteristics include economic 
meltdown; repressive undemocratic government; myopic land (farm) grabbing „policy‟; 
self-interested groups; and corruption and criminality.
354
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Zimbabwe has failed the credibility test of good governance. According to the US 
Department of State, although the Zimbabwean Constitution provides for an independent 
judiciary, in practice, “many judges have been under intense pressure to conform to 
government policies, and the Government has repeatedly refused to abide by judicial 
decisions with which it did not agree.”355 Overall…  
 
the main outstanding governance issues include the on-going political impasse with the Western 
governments; poor performance of public enterprises; weak fiscal expenditure controls; high levels of 
corruption; high administrative controls; weak public service delivery; underutilization of the farmland and 
lack of clarity on issues related to land tenure rights and ownership; uncertainty over property rights; and, 
inadequate provision of social safety nets.
356
 
 
Meanwhile, the electoral process in Zimbabwe is not transparent. Rather, it is 
characterized by widespread political violence and intimidation. Zimbabwe registered at 
least „30 assassinations and 18 000 cases of assaults, property damage, displacement from 
home areas, detention, abdication, death threats, and interference with the right to 
campaign and  vote freely” during its 2000 parliamentary elections.357 Rejected by the 
Zimbabwean main opposition party and Western donors, the results of these elections 
challenged NEPAD‟s vision of good governance.358 Likewise, the International Crisis 
Group described the 2005 parliamentary elections as neither free nor fair while mass post 
electoral violence in 2008 questioned the legitimacy of President Robert Mugabe‟s 
regime.
359
  
 
In 2008, contested elections in Zimbabwe was fuelled by massive political violence 
because the incumbents‟ government compromised the freedom of electoral institutions 
for personal gains, and the electoral body became an extension of the ruling party “which 
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accounted in large measure for it‟s over confidence and the surprise and shock it got as 
the results began to come in.”360  
 
As a result of endless issues related to governance, human rights, democracy, and 
political stability, Zimbabwe has received widespread condemnation from the 
international community, Western donors and multilateral institutions at the turn of the 
new millennium. The U.S for instance introduced Bill S.494 which restricts foreign aid to 
Zimbabwe until government restores the rule of law, ensures democratic elections, 
implements an equitable, legal and transparent land reform, withdraws troops from the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, and establishes firm civilian control of the military, 
police and other states security forces.
361
 
 
At present, Zimbabwe is not part of the HIPC club and the country‟s debt situation is 
above the HIPC threshold. “Arrears clearance is a prerequisite to full engagement and 
ability to borrow from the IFIs.”362 While Ghana and Rwanda had their foreign aid cut off 
as a result of good governance practices, reversed behaviour in Zimbabwe caused the 
country‟s external foreign aid reserve to be unsustainable. In 2003, Zimbabwe‟s total 
external debt reached US$ 5,182 million which amounted to an increase of 173% to GDP 
from a based low of 64% in 1998.
363
 In the same year (2003) IMF suspended the country 
after it failed to service its debt.
364
 This has also affected the country‟s ODA 
performance.  
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8.1 Trends in ODA to Zimbabwe 
 
Bad governance in Zimbabwe has strained relationship between the country and the 
donor community. Major donor economies such as the EU, the U.S and Commonwealth 
countries imposed targeted sanctions (primarily travel bans and freezing of overseas-held 
personal assets) on Senior ZANU-PF officials and their families due to governance and 
human rights related issues.
365
 The result was an immediate decline in aid relationship 
between Zimbabwe and its developed partners. Currently, Zimbabwe remains an aid 
orphan country. It is left with few donors and development partners willing or able to 
engage on a large scale relationship with the ruling party on development programmes.  
 
                                 Figure 15: Zimbabwe - Official Aid Transfers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                              Source: World Bank, 2005 
 
In Zimbabwe, “medium-and long-term capital flows, as well as direct investment, have 
dried up.”366 For example, government to government aid flow in the form of grants has 
shrunk, from about US$100 million per annum in the mid 1990s to about 40 million in 
2001 to about US$30 million only in 2000 and 2003 respectively ( above 15). Decline in 
ODA and private investment flows is linked to unstable domestic macroeconomic 
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environment in the country and to negative perceptions by donor community on issues of 
political and economic governance that have destroyed the country‟s image.367  
 
Zimbabwe‟s economic indicators are worrisome. In the 1980s the country stood with an 
annual inflation of 11.8%; a GDP growth of rate of 10.7%; a GDP per capita of US$755; 
and an unemployment rate of 30%.
368
 By the year 2009, the country‟s economic system 
reached a stand still. The economy registered a GDP growth rate hyperinflation of above 
231 million%; a GDP growth rate of -6.1%; a GDP per capita of US$402; and an 
unemployment rate of 94%.
369
 
 
In this regard, the problems facing Zimbabwe are domestic issues which could be 
resolved through the restoration of good governance and democracy. While the 
Zimbabwean crisis challenges the present hypothesis, achieving “mutual accountability” 
and “mutual responsibility” in this country within the context of NEPAD is beyond the 
control of the international community and aid donors. It is rather in the hands of the 
central government of Zimbabwe. Therefore, it can be said that, NEPAD‟s vision of 
attracting more FDI and more ODA flows to Zimbabwe could not be achieved because 
the country itself has not done its part in terms of establishing the necessary conditions to 
achieve these goals including commitment to democratic good governance.   
 
9. Conclusion 
 
It holds true that it is likely to have “mutual accountability” and “mutual responsibility” 
between African economies and their development partners. As African countries 
account for and take charge of their own governance issues, their development partners 
are most keen to be loyal to their aid commitments for development. This has been the 
case in Ghana and Rwanda. On the contrary, inherent reluctance from the part of 
President Mugabe‟s regime to govern in a democratic fashion has led NEPAD to fail in 
Zimbabwe.   
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Therefore, the hypothesis that the donor community will provide more financial resources 
for development to countries that reaffirm their commitment to democratic good 
governance proves not to be false. It was factual that ODA has improved in Ghana and in 
Rwanda where democracy and the rule of law reign but has deteriorated in fragile and 
failed Zimbabwe where the room for democracy and good governance is missing.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusion and Recommendations  
 
1. Summary 
 
This study began with the assumption that NEPAD‟s strategic trade and investment 
partnership seems to be a realistic and beneficial project for the development of Africa. 
To test this hypothesis, the study has assessed whether NEPAD as a strategic partnership 
has been successful in changing the trade and investments context of Africa since its 
inception, to affect the economic growth and development of the region.  
 
The central research question assessed the success of the liberal assumptions that 
underpin NEPAD. Within liberalism, aspects of international cooperation and economic 
interdependence helped explaining key concepts of NEPAD such as “mutual 
partnership”, “mutual accountability” and “mutual responsibility.” Based on these 
concepts, NEPAD assumes that Africa‟s development partners shall reward more 
resources for development to those African countries that would show strong 
commitment to good governance particularly through peer review mechanism.  
 
This challenges dependency theorists who assume that NEPAD is over-ambitious to 
expect developed countries to transfer resources for development to Africa as a result of 
its resource mobilization strategy. In other words, while liberal theorists argue that 
NEPAD is a positive-sum game which could lead to positive outcomes, arguments from 
the dependency theorists suggest otherwise. The dependency school views NEPAD as 
rather an instrument to increase the overreliance of Africa on the developed world.   
 
What was crucial in answering the central research question was the assessment of 
NEPAD‟s resource mobilization strategy which includes capital flows and market access 
initiatives. The CFI initiative involves issues related to FDI and ODA while the MAI 
comprises amongst other things the sensitive and overarching issue of agriculture. These 
were the variables used to test whether “mutual partnership” in trade and investment has 
been achieved between Africa and its developed partners. In terms of that partnership, 
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Africa as a whole was requested by its development partners, but also promised itself, to 
comply with democracy; good governance, peace and security in return for more 
FDI/ODA and for more access to their markets (e.g. trade in agriculture). 
 
On the issues of “mutual accountability” and “mutual responsibility” the chapter moved 
from assessing relations between Africa as whole with its development partners to a 
country case study: Ghana. The rationale was to find out whether commitments to good 
governance in Ghana have led to more resources for development in the country from the 
developed world. Although good governance is a complex topic, the chapter picked up 
one component of DPG (enhance constitutional democracy, including periodical political 
competition and opportunity for choice, the rule of law, citizen‟s rights, as entrenched in 
all African and international human rights instruments) and one from EGD (pursue 
transparency, effectiveness and predictability of government economic policies under 
the) to assess their impact on ODA.  
 
2. Main findings 
 
When assessing NEPAD‟s success, one could measure two kinds of overlapping 
progress: (1) country‟s ability to implement the NEPAD framework and (2) the 
realization of goals and objectives that the programme intends to promote. These goals 
include the promotion of democracy, good governance, peace and security on the one 
hand, and on the other hand, the achievement of market access and capital flows as 
outlined in NEPAD‟s RMS. 
 
NEPAD has indeed been successful because African countries are by and large 
implementing policies that are in conformity with the programme‟s objective of 
democracy and good governance. These include openness to trade and investment 
through market-led policies, sounds economic management, transparency, adherence to 
democracy and the rule of law...etc.  
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In other worlds, it has been found that good governance has improved in Africa after 
NEPAD and that the continent is more stable and more peaceful comparing to recent pre-
NEPAD periods. This is evident from the adoption of the APRM in countries like Ghana 
and Rwanda to test and reaffirm such commitment.  These countries have rebounded after 
a long period of ethnic conflict and political instabilities and are now serving as examples 
of leading lights of democracy and good governance in Africa. NEPAD should therefore 
take some credits for that.  
 
To reiterate on the hypothesis of the study, it has also been found that good governance 
leads to more ODA. Indeed, Ghana‟s success has been the commitment to good 
governance. This holds true particularly of Rwanda which has accumulated more ODA 
flows for similar reasons. On the contrary, crisis in Zimbabwe has reaffirmed the counter 
argument that bad governance hinders resource transfer from the developed world to 
Africa. Therefore, where good governance reigns, “mutual accountability” and “mutual 
responsibility” are easy to be found whereas in the presence of bad governance, these 
goals became difficult to realize.  
  
However, the assessment of NEPAD‟s goal of increasing capital flows and market access 
in Africa has produced mixed results. NEPAD‟s assumption holds true in terms of 
attracting more FDI into Africa comparing to ODA. The programme has also done little 
in terms of ameliorating patterns of agriculture between Africa and its developed 
partners. Likewise, NEPAD has been a success in Ghana and in Rwanda whilst economic 
situations in Zimbabwe have challenged the very existence of the country thus 
undermining the programme‟s vision to change the trade and investment context of the 
country.  
 
Overall, NEPAD has done more good than harm in its race to mobilize more resource for 
development in Africa. Although Africa‟s share of global FDI and ODA still remains 
smaller comparing to other developing region, the programme has done a significant job 
in terms of filling the resource gap of Africa for development thanks to initiative such as 
improvement of the business climate of Africa through the promotion of good 
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governance agenda, the creation of PPP including the African Investment Initiative, the 
campaign against the perception of Africa as a high risk zone, and the promotion of 
marked-led policy reforms in Africa. These initiatives reinforce the hypothesis that 
NEPAD is built upon a “mutual partnership” agreement with its development partners.  
 
As far as agriculture is concerned, although African countries are not doing well in terms 
of accessing the market of their development partners, NEPAD‟s focus on fixing up 
supply constraints in this sector including bridging the infrastructure gap has been a 
positive move not only to increase trade and development in Africa but also to attract 
more FDI. Therefore, projects such as the CAADP, STAP, and fund like the NEPAD-
IPPF seem to be promising features of trade and investment and could in return 
ameliorate the long-term development of Africa.  
 
Therefore, one can conclude that, NEPAD‟s attempt to improve trade and investment 
flows to Africa is work in progress. However, the programme faces a number of 
challenges which if not dealt with will jeopardize its long-term vision. These challenges 
include the supply constraints facing the MAI, and debt cancellation as a common 
modality for ODA provision. Despite these challenge, NEPAD still remains an important 
instrument in improving the trade and investment climate of Africa and not a tool of 
dependency. 
 
3. Policy Recommendations 
 
NEPAD is currently the only Marshall Plan that Africa has and failure not to nourish this 
programme will harm development prospects in the entire continent. However, its 
success in mobilizing resources for development is overshadowed by the priority given to 
debt relief over more tangible targets such as budget support and investment in physical 
infrastructure. Although, debt relief is a crucial problem for many if not all African 
nations, debt cancellation should be balanced with high ODA for development and 
increased private investment.  
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The success of NEPAD depends on these concepts of “mutual partnership” “mutual 
accountability” and “mutual responsibility.” NEPAD‟s developing partners hold the key 
of its success and should be the first to account for it. Therefore, to accelerate partnership, 
African countries need to fully implement NEPAD and translate it into domestic policies. 
They should for instance implement the CAADP framework to improve agricultural 
growth and market access.  
 
Further than that, African countries have not done enough to speed up peer review 
process. NEPAD‟s developing countries particularly those that have signed up the 
voluntary APRM should be peer reviewed to continue their commitments to it. 
 
On the other hand, NEPAD‟s developed partners should continue to honour their aid 
promises to Africa even at a time of crisis. For example, African countries should not be 
the victims of a crisis they did not cause. Africa is vulnerable of the current (2008-2009) 
global economic and financial slowdown. Therefore, crisis like this should not be an 
excuse for NEPAD‟s developed economies to cut spending on development projects in 
Africa. 
 
Finally, for it to be more developmental a project, NEPAD needs to focus on bottom-up 
policies or development from below. For example, it seems like ODA and FDI to Africa 
most likely benefit those industrialized African countries that have the infrastructural 
capacity needed to absorb such investments. Therefore, NEPAD‟s relationship with its 
developed partners should talk more about the development of smaller countries and 
poorer nations in Africa.   
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